

November 21, 1942

THE *Nation*

3 QUESTIONS

Was Hull Right on Vichy? - - - *Robert Bendiner*

Can We "Use" Darlans? - - - - *Freda Kirchwey*

Have We a Second Front? - - - - *D. W. Mitchell*

✱

Talking of India

BY KINGSLEY MARTIN

✱

Legislation for a Total War

BY I. F. STONE

Never Beyond This Shore

HERE at the sea's edge is as near to Jim as I can go. Other women have gone farther than this. There were women on Corregidor; women have gone to Ireland and Australia and Iceland; women have been lost in the Battle of the Atlantic.

But I know I would be foolish to dream of serving as they have. For a woman to go farther than this shore demands a special skill, complete independence—and I have neither.

No, my task is here, here in the little storm-tight house that sits back from the cove, here with my son.

And if I become discontent with the seeming smallness of my task, Jim's words come back to steady me. "I'm leaving you a very important job, Mary. Until this war is won, there won't be any more evenings when we can sit by the fireside and plan our tomorrows together. It will be up to you to make the plans for the three of us.

"Mary," he said, "keep our dreams alive."

★ ★ ★

MAKE no little plans, you who build the dream castles here at home. When you try to imagine the future, after he returns, be sure your imaginings are full of bright and cheerful hues, for that world of tomorrow will be resplendent in things you don't know—never even imagined. Allow for wonderful new developments in such fields as television, fluorescent lighting, plastics. And leave a flexible horizon for the marvels that are sure to come from the new science of electronics. When you're dreaming of your better tomorrow, count on us. General Electric Company, Schenectady, N. Y.

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THE VOLUME of General Electric war production is so high and the degree of secrecy required is so great that we can tell you little about it now. When it can be told completely we believe that the story of industry's developments during the war years will make one of the most fascinating chapters in the history of industrial progress.

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LETTERS TO

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The Shape of Things

THAT THE GERMANS ARE SENDING FRESH forces into Tunis is significant. Since they cannot hope for victory in that region unless the disposition of forces in Europe is very much changed, it would seem that Berlin intends to fight a holding action in North Africa while preparing a blow elsewhere. Against whom will that blow be aimed? Turkey or Spain? Ankara has reported that German garrisons in the Balkans have been greatly strengthened, but it would be unwise to keep one's eyes too steadily fixed on that quarter. It is at least reasonable to believe that the German High Command would be much relieved if they could prevent consolidation of Anglo-American bases in North Africa. Hitler must surely wish to strike a speedy blow at the United States in order to show the German people and conquered Europe that the Americans are powerless to invade Europe. If that should be his decision, then Spain offers the only battlefield upon which he has any chance to counter our North African move. The closing of the Straits of Gibraltar would so endanger the entire supply system of the Anglo-American forces west of Libya that we might be compelled to make a "premature" counter-invasion and so risk confronting strong, well-prepared German forces. In other words, Hitler may decide to repeat his Norwegian maneuver.

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BESIDES THE ENORMOUS GAINS REPRESENTED by control of the Straits of Gibraltar, a Spanish venture may seem to offer many other advantages to Hitler. Even should Franco decide to resist, his army is in no condition for serious fighting. By giving opportunity for a campaign of rapid movement Spain conforms to German tactical preferences, and the German leader, remembering the Napoleonic campaign, may reason that, after all, an invasion of Spain now would merely be forestalling a United Nations move later. Hitler will have learned by this time that the old paralysis is gone. No longer is there a reluctance among the democracies to invade so-called neutral territory. That the occupation of Spain would not be all advantage is true. Previous to our seizure of North Africa many experts held that Hitler preferred not to burden himself with fresh terri-

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tories to police and new coastlines to defend. That can no longer be his main consideration. A far greater hazard is implicit in our own North African plans. Neither London nor Washington may wish to open the ball in Spain; yet the Allies cannot have sent so many men into the Mediterranean without taking into account the chance that Hitler might strike back through the Peninsula. It would be unwise to put exclusive trust in Franco's word or in Hitler's readiness to oblige the Spanish dictator. Once again there has been no change of heart in official Spain; the recent Cabinet shifts were only a change of guard. America must stand watch, therefore, against the Spanish troops in North Africa as well as Hitler's forces. The Straits are too precious to lose.

★

WE HAVE WON THE SECOND ROUND OF THE Battle for the Solomons in dashing style against a numerically superior enemy fleet. Warm congratulations for the navy, which has received some well-deserved brickbats in the past year, are now in order. Admiral Nimitz, in particular, merits commendation for ignoring the adage and changing the command in the Solomons area. His choice of Vice-Admiral W. F. Halsey, who is brilliantly living up to his reputation as an aggressive in-fighter, has been thoroughly justified. The Navy Department deserves our thanks, too, for releasing quickly a comprehensive account of the battle, including an apparently complete admission of losses which, while painful, represent a comparatively low price for the damage inflicted on the enemy. The Japanese fleet, dispatched to the waters around Guadalcanal for the purpose of landing heavy reinforcements and supplies on that island, was a powerful one, but significantly it appears not to have included any carriers. It approached at night and was caught off guard by a bold maneuver which sent our lighter ships racing between its lines. The smashing success thus scored was followed up the next day by aerial attacks on enemy transport and supply ships which accounted for ten vessels and thousands of troops. The withdrawal of the crippled Japanese task force provides us with an opportunity to clean up the enemy on Guadalcanal, and it should also facilitate MacArthur's operations against Buna. But as Secretary Knox warns us, the Japanese navy is not knocked out and we must be ready for the next round.

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MUCH OF THE STING IN REPRESENTATIVE Maas's strictures on our Pacific war policy has been removed by the new victory in the Solomons. The Navy Department does seem to be mending its news policy gradually, and Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur have recently cooperated to such good effect that the admitted dangers of divided command in the southern

Pacific appear less glaring than before. Mr. Maas, of course, spoke with some authority as a member of the House Naval Affairs Committee and as a colonel in the Marines recently on active service in New Guinea, but he had little new to say about specific shortcomings. When, however, he turned in his radio address to matters of global strategy he gave voice to more original and more questionable ideas. His theme was the absolute necessity of defeating Japan no matter what happens in Europe, and he insinuated that our High Command was frittering away our strength on expeditions in too many different directions and neglecting the Pacific theater. In weighing the force of his arguments we have to remember that prior to Pearl Harbor Mr. Maas was an isolationist and as such must bear his share of responsibility for helping to delay the preparedness which would have enabled us to carry on war against Japan more effectively. Like other isolationists Mr. Maas sticks to the idea that the war against Japan is peculiarly "our war" and that the battle for Europe is of secondary importance. Nobody who can think in such compartmental terms has any business talking about global strategy. What is the sense of saying, "It makes little difference who wins in Europe . . . if the Japs win the Pacific"? Is it not equally true that if Hitler wins in Europe our chance of victory in the Pacific will be shattered?

★

WITH THE TOTAL OCCUPATION OF FRANCE by Hitler the situation of the leaders of the French democracy has become extremely precarious. Though the principal figures of the Riom trial could not expect any real justice from the magistrates of the Pétain regime their lives were not in danger. They were protected by the growing feeling of sympathy and respect that the dignified behavior of Léon Blum and the awakening of Edouard Daladier had aroused all over France. As for Georges Mandel and Paul Reynaud, they were never even brought to trial. Reynaud's weakness at the end disposed the capitulators in his favor. Mandel, on the contrary, terrified the men of Vichy. He knew too much about them, and the prospect of having him address the tribunal with his usual courage appalled officials who might easily be transformed from accusers into accused. Herriot and Jeanneney were from time to time subjected to certain restrictive police measures but never to a real prosecution. Even Laval realized that the French people stood with these men. But Himmler will not be so sensitive to past records or present prestige. In Czecho-Slovakia, in Poland, in Norway, he has liquidated the men who have taken a similar stand. It is not likely that he will show more restraint in France. And the fate of these leaders, exposed by their prominence, will be shared by thousands of anonymous fighters for democracy, who have fallen, together with all France, into Hitler's hands.

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AS FOR THE THOUSANDS OF ANTI-FASCISTS—Jews and non-Jews—who in the last fifteen years had come from all over Europe to find refuge in France, their fate is symbolized by the terrible news that Francisco Largo Caballero has been delivered to Franco by the Gestapo. The seventy-five-year-old Loyalist Premier, one of the most venerated figures of the whole international labor movement, now faces a firing squad as the end of his heroic career. It is to be hoped that all the American and Latin American labor organizations, together with every other decent human being in this hemisphere, will ask President Roosevelt to use his influence, by means of the radio, to prevent Caballero's execution.

★

THE ONLY REFUGEES FROM THE DICTATORS who may benefit from developments in the Mediterranean are the anti-fascists in North Africa—provided, that is, that the American command will take them under its protection. Messages directing attention to them have come from many parts of the world. Among the most interesting is one signed by General Vicente Rojo, the Loyalist commander whose offensive on the Ebro won him universal respect. With other Spanish generals now in Buenos Aires he offers his services to President Roosevelt, suggesting that he organize in two divisions the 30,000 men of the former Spanish Loyalist army who were sent to North Africa by Vichy and Hitler. Though such action is hardly feasible as long as we continue to recognize Franco, their liberation, as well as that of thousands of Italians, Jews, and others, should not be delayed.

★

LEND-LEASE SHIPMENTS IN OCTOBER CAME close to the billion-dollar mark for the first time since the outset of the war. President Roosevelt has announced that despite the preparations for the North African campaign we provided more than \$915 billion worth of supplies to our allies, two-thirds of which were military items. This is welcome news indeed after the many months in which lend-lease shipments fell far short of expectation and need. Eighteen months ago it was estimated that we should have to provide a minimum of one billion dollars' worth a month in order to offset the advantages gained by Germany through its European conquests. That the United Nations have been unable until within the past few weeks to assume the offensive may be attributed largely to our failure even to approximate this goal. But recent events tell a different story. The importance of our growing lend-lease shipments is particularly evident in the African campaign. President Roosevelt declared recently that our total shipments of military equipment, food, and industrial supplies to the British army in Egypt totaled \$636,952,000 in the nineteen months ending October 1. This included more than

1,000 planes, more than 500 medium tanks, and 20,000 trucks. A group of American-made Sherman tanks and self-propelled 105-millimeter guns which were sent after the fall of Tobruk proved of incalculable value in the final decision, according to Prime Minister Churchill. We trust that a similar story may be told before many months about Russia and China.

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NOT SO LONG AGO A STRIKING PROPOSAL was made by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. T. V. Soong. He urged that the United Nations begin now to create the new order that must follow the war, that they organize "a realistic machinery for collective security" and set it to work "before this war ends and while the pressures of war make it possible for such cooperation to catch hold." He spoke as one of the leaders of the nation that suffered first and has suffered most grievously from the failure of the League of Nations. But he spoke not out of discouragement but out of hope. Now his appeal has been echoed and expanded in a remarkable message from Chiang Kai-shek to the *Herald Tribune* Forum, meeting last Tuesday in New York. After discussing the essentially democratic texture of Chinese society and the firm determination of the Chinese people to move forward into complete political democracy, the Chinese President strongly repudiated the idea that after the war China might emerge as "the leader of Asia." China, he said had no desire to replace Western imperialism in Asia with an Oriental imperialism or isolationism of its own. And he called upon the United Nations to "start at once to organize an international order and embracing all peoples to enforce peace and justice among them." These words contrast pleasantly with the recent pronouncement in behalf of empire made by Britain's unreconstructible Prime Minister.

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NO WRITER OR RADIO NEWS ANALYST HAS discussed the effects of the appointment of Admiral Darlan as head of the French administration in North Africa with more open distrust than Edward Murrow, speaking for the Columbia Broadcasting System from London. In the course of his report Mr. Murrow summed up Darlan's Vichy career in these lines:

Let's look at this man's record. On February 10, 1941, he became Vice-President of the Council, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and the Navy. One of his first acts was to turn over political refugees to the Germans. He began at once to adopt Gestapo methods. His government was responsible for the sending of foreigners, mostly Spanish Republicans, from internment camps in France to slave-gang labor on the Trans-Sahara railway. He intensified the anti-Semitic measures. His police force helped the Germans round up Alsatian refugees in unoccupied France by the Germans. In July his government practically turned over

Indo-China to the Japanese, thereby opening the back door to Singapore. In October a certain Carl Holtz, a German officer, was assassinated in Nantes. Six days later Admiral Darlan's government handed over thirty hostages to the Germans—Frenchmen. They were shot.

When the British went into Madagascar, Darlan gave the order to resist, saying, "Make the British pay as heavy a price as possible for their act of highway banditry." He asserted that the British had betrayed France in Flanders, tried to starve women and children in Djibouti, and that the day would come when England would pay. And now this man is given political domination over North Africa—with American support.

The British press and radio, acting under guidance, take the line that for the time being military considerations dominate. . . . One wonders whether we may not stand dishonored in the eyes of the conquered people on the Continent who have been led to believe through Anglo-American propaganda that Darlan is one of the greatest living traitors.

Poll-Tax Filibuster

CAPITOL HILL agrees that if the bill abolishing the poll tax could be brought to a vote in the Senate, it would be approved by a majority comparable to that which it secured in the House. Nevertheless, the bill is in grave danger, for its passage is being fought by a gang of Southern Senators with every weapon in the arsenal of obstruction. Their tactics can be defeated, but only by determined majority leadership backed by the strong support of public opinion, which must be brought to bear not on the opponents of the bill—they are a hopeless case—but on those Senators who, while prepared to vote the right way, may contribute to its defeat by their slackness.

Last week Senator Barkley of Kentucky, who has accepted responsibility for pushing the measure through, sought in vain to bring it formally before the Senate. Friday's session was wasted by parliamentary maneuvers and prolonged debate over the question of whether the Judiciary Committee's favorable report had been properly adopted. On Saturday, while Senator Bilbo of Mississippi continued what appeared to be a promising filibuster, other members of the Southern bloc absented themselves in the hope of preventing a quorum. This move was countered by an order to the sergeant-at-arms to arrest Senators present in the city. But the session ended without any progress being achieved.

It is to be hoped that better attendance by Senators known to favor the bill will prevent any repetition of this time-consuming stunt, but it will inevitably be succeeded by new tricks. Senator Bilbo, while denouncing suggestions that he is planning a filibuster, has promised to talk from now to January 3, when the present

Congress expires. And his lead is being followed by supposedly responsible men such as Connally of Texas and George of Georgia. The last-named, for instance, is proposing to attempt to tack on to the bill an amendment calling for a forty-eight-hour week, and some forty other equally irrelevant and controversial amendments are promised.

There can be only one answer to this attempt by a reckless and bigoted minority to obstruct democratic processes. As Senator Norris, who is fighting to kill the poll tax in the last great battle of his noble career, has said: "We can break this filibuster if we fight fire with fire. We'll have to invoke every parliamentary rule in the book to do it, but the Senate ought to have the right to vote on a question that is as fundamental as the abolition of the vicious poll tax." We hope Senator Barkley will be courageous enough to follow this example and that the majority favoring the bill will not submit to the dictation of a minority. Should they allow this to happen, they would be acquiescing in the disruption of orderly government and exposing the Senate to the raucous laughter of the anti-democratic forces throughout the world. Goebbels could not ask for more.

Man-Power Planning

THE report of a subcommittee of the Truman committee provides us with the nearest thing to a man-power program that has yet been offered—eleven and a half months after Pearl Harbor. On the whole, the subcommittee's program is a remarkably sensible one. It stresses the necessity for balancing our military and industrial man-power needs before establishing the details of our man-power policy. To this end it suggests the appointment of a single head with powers comparable to those of Byrnes in the economic field, who would have a voice in determining basic military and war-production requirements. This view has wide support in Congress, and reports indicate that the appointment of a man-power director may shortly be effected. In the absence of any over-all policy or the machinery for carrying out such a policy, the Truman subcommittee believes that it would be "a mistake for Congress even to consider passage of any drastic compulsory legislation." On this point the findings of the subcommittee concur fully with the recommendations of the Tolan committee, the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission, and the recent conference of the C. I. O. leaders.

And for the immediate present the judgment is scarcely open to dispute. Under present conditions no government agency—the Selective Service System, the United States Employment Service, or the Manpower Commission itself—is equipped to handle a program of

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compulsory labor placement. To attempt compulsion without a plan or machinery to carry it out would only arouse antagonism and imperil the management-labor truce which has prevailed for the past year.

This fact does not, however, justify the faith in voluntary measures shown by the Tolan and Truman groups. The Truman report declares, for instance, that "once a definite, clear-cut man-power policy which makes sense is announced . . . voluntary cooperation will be forthcoming in full measure." The experience of cities like Baltimore and Buffalo, where voluntary measures have been given a fair and extended trial, fails to bear out this conclusion. Under any system most placements would be made voluntarily, but experience indicates that reliance on voluntary methods—without a big stick in reserve—leads to muddling and procrastination. The contrast between the level of war production in the United States with its voluntary measures and that of Great Britain or Russia provides an unanswerable argument in favor of some form of compulsion.

On other matters the Truman group is on firmer ground. It is far more specific than any other such group has been in urging the expansion of nursery schools and supervision for the children of working mothers after school hours. It urges an aggressive campaign "to eliminate hiring prejudices of all kinds, whether because of age, sex, or race." In suggesting that the work week be lengthened to forty-eight hours whenever practicable, it avoids the danger that this will merely be a means of contributing to employers' profits by retaining the bonus for overtime and providing that additional overtime wages be paid in war bonds. Unfortunately, the recommendation left a loophole at this point by suggesting that employers be *permitted* rather than *required* to pay time and a half for all work over forty hours a week. While existing union contracts would presumably be honored under this proposal, unorganized workers would apparently lose the protection now afforded by the Fair Labor Standards Act. This would be in sharp contrast with wartime labor policies in Great Britain and Russia.

The discussions of man-power policy at the C. I. O. conference focused attention on the chief weakness in all discussions of man-power to date, a weakness that pervades all aspects of the war program—failure to take account of and provide representation for men who really do the work. No man-power policy, voluntary or compulsory, can possibly succeed without the confidence and active cooperation of the men on the job. British experience suggests that the surest way to obtain labor's cooperation is to give it an adequate place in the key war agencies. And this is not merely a device for salving labor's pride. When it comes to the formulation of man-power policy, the chief points of issue will not be large questions such as compulsion versus voluntary methods. The sore points are much more likely to be such ques-

tions as seniority, overtime pay, the payment of transportation and moving expenses, housing, and a hundred and one minor matters of direct concern to the workers. Such matters will not be adequately taken care of unless labor is given a direct and influential voice in the shaping of an over-all man-power program.

America's First Quisling

BY FRED KIRCHWEY

PROSTITUTES are used; they are seldom loved. Even less frequently are they honored. But Darlan has been put at the head of the military and civil administration of French Africa by the American command.

There was reason to use Darlan. No other French official knows as much as he about the military and naval installations in Africa from Dakar to Bizerte, and his services were worth a good sum. But office and power were too high a price to pay, as we are rapidly finding out. What doubtless appeared a reasonable military expedient is proving a costly political blunder, and various government spokesmen in Washington are trying to mitigate the effect of the transaction by explaining that it is only a temporary deal at worst, due to be abandoned as soon as its immediate purposes have been secured. Unfortunately—or perhaps fortunately—this confession of sharp practice is not very disarming. Democratic statesmen who announce their intention to double-cross a double-crosser cut a rather sorry figure in the eyes of friends and enemies alike.

Darlan had motives of his own for wanting to be bought. Certainly he was looking out for his own interests, as he has always done. He may also have been serving Vichy as an anchor to windward just in case the Allies should defeat Hitler after all. Whatever his reasons, his knowledge and collaboration were ours for the buying. And it is difficult to believe that they could not have been had at a reasonable price. But if his favors could really be won only by setting him up as our Quisling in North Africa, we should have done without them—even if lives were to be lost and military advantage forfeited as a consequence. For the United States has only one claim on the allegiance of the peoples of the world: an honest and courageous democratic policy. To the extent that we have strayed from that policy—in our dealings with Spain, with Vichy; in our past dealings with the major fascist powers—we have already compromised our position of democratic leadership. We can't afford new ventures in double-dealing or in reactionary diplomacy even in the interest of military gains. The price is too high.

Small incidents often illuminate the effect of important measures. On the day the elevation of Darlan was

first rumored, a *Nation* editor telephoned a friend in the office of the Fighting French to ask him what it all meant. He refused to discuss it and seemed distressed to think that a responsible journalist could take such obvious nonsense seriously. He dismissed the story as just another of the countless rumors that had been flying out of Vichy, designed to confuse and mislead the unwary. "It absolutely could not be true," he said. What must have been the feeling of our friend when the unbelievable turned out to be the fact?

Multiply this Frenchman by his millions of compatriots in and out of France itself who look to our army to free their country not merely from alien rule but from the rule of men who are traitors and tyrants in their own right. What are their emotions as they see Darlan established as civil and military chief of the new Free French Empire? And what will be the answer of the men and women of France when we ask them to rise in revolt against Axis slavery under the leadership of one of the gang that sold them into slavery in the first place? The French people want to destroy their traitors, not follow them.

The first political mistake was made when the American forces carried through the North African operations without inviting the cooperation of the Fighting French or even consulting their leaders. De Gaulle should have been associated with the venture from the start; he should have marched into Africa side by side with Eisenhower. The second mistake was made when Giraud was chosen to lead the forces in North Africa, also without consultation with the Fighting French. Giraud, a brave man and a distinguished general, should have placed himself under the leadership of De Gaulle, who for two and a half hard years has directed the entire French military resistance to the Axis and has rallied the hopes and support of the vast majority of the French people. The third mistake was Darlan—and this last mistake will prove a political disaster no military success can offset.

After an interval of rejoicing over the American move into Africa, the Fighting French, especially in London, began to ask, though with commendable restraint, why their services and advice had been so pointedly ignored. The sudden emergence of Darlan overwhelmed their reticence. In a powerful statement, following immediately on a conference with Churchill, De Gaulle said flatly that the Fighting French had had no hand in and assumed no responsibility for "negotiations in progress in North Africa with the representatives of Vichy," and that any arrangements "which would in effect establish a Vichy regime" there could not be accepted. This was a clear-cut political act—an announcement to his followers in all countries and particularly to the illegal fighters in France that they had not been deserted and betrayed by their leaders.

The bitterness and resentment now expressed openly

in French circles here and abroad are echoed all over the world—in Latin America, in the occupied lands of Europe, among our other fighting allies, and not least in the hearts of democratic Americans. And they arise from a deep-seated suspicion that the appointment of Darlan was not merely an ill-advised bit of strategy. It fits too well in the tight, complex pattern of appeasement to be so easily extricated.

Darlan is not an isolated case. He is in direct descent from Hitler, from Mussolini, from Franco, from Vichy itself. The men who preferred to sell oil to Mussolini for his Ethiopian invasion rather than risk his downfall by applying effective sanctions; who sacrificed Republican Spain to Hitler and Mussolini and then supported the fascist dictator they had brought to power; who have steadily upheld Pétain and frozen out the Fighting French—these are the men who find satisfaction today in the subversion of Darlan, the sudden acquisition of Flandin and Pucheu. The appeasers have never been in a majority even in the State Department, but from 1935 until this hour they have been able to force the long series of concessions and bargains which bit by bit weakened the force of democratic resistance and helped to bring on the war they opposed. They have at all times feared democracy more than fascism, and revolution more than anything else on earth. Today their fear of democracy and revolution poisons their hope of victory. So they maneuver to keep in power those groups which may, they hope, rob victory of its terrors and insure a European order safely secured behind the bars of social and political reaction.

To win Darlan to the "Allied cause" was for them not merely a temporary strategic necessity but a political triumph—appeasement's first real success. If they can add Laval and Pétain they will be even better pleased.

I wrote a final paragraph for this article, and it concerned a dream. It was a dream of American invading forces on the borders of Germany, and of a deal with Göring. He offered us the Luftwaffe and a part of the Nazi army. We accepted his services and raised him to power. It was a nice idea but a little too fantastic to set down as a realistic possibility. Today, as we go to press, I read the column of Arthur Krock in the *New York Times*, quoting official Washington opinion on the Darlan appointment. In it I find these lines:

One of those [officials] questioned said today: "War has forced us idealists and democrats to quantitative, rather than qualitative, morality as the test. If, for example, Göring should offer to come over with a few planes, we don't want him. He will cost more than he will contribute. But if he can bring the Luftwaffe with him we'll receive him."

And so I have thrown away my former conclusion. I find it wasn't a dream after all.

EVER with what bill for an last chance cies into between ta will be m power to order, or b The armed will oppose In the w will no do ful to foc Senate and of the war the Senate headed by men are su These fi Senators T Representa because it months of three main capacity fo government ing agency sary policy the home f the war-pro as-usual fo all-out effor The easi tional probl bill reflects tended to co there would latter woul with the pro supplies. T Section 7-a (1) the W Plants Corp Navy, and T mission, and

A Bill for Total War

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, November 16

EVERY American anxious to back our fighting men with the maximum of arms and supplies should do what he can to support the Kilgore-Pepper-Tolan bill for an Office of War Mobilization. This may be the last chance for many months to weld scattered war agencies into one effective organization, and the difference between taking some such step now or taking it later will be measured in lives. The President has it in his power to effect the purposes of this bill by executive order, or he can use his influence to prevent its passage. The armed services and the big-business crowd generally will oppose it.

In the welter of conflicting advice on the subject which will no doubt be offered, Mr. Roosevelt may find it useful to focus attention on one point. There are seven Senate and House committees investigating the conduct of the war on the home front. All but two of them, the Senate and House Military Affairs Committees, are headed by New Dealers. And all the New Deal chairmen are supporting this bill.

These five committee or subcommittee chairmen—Senators Truman, Murray, Pepper, and Kilgore and Representative Tolan—have united behind this measure because it embodies the constructive conclusions of months of investigation. It is a bill for total war. It has three main purposes. One is to bring order and greater capacity for effective action to a branch of emergency government badly crippled by the rivalries of overlapping agencies. The second is to impose clear and necessary policy directives on the men in charge of mobilizing the home front. The third is to end the domination of the war-production machine by monopolistic and business-as-usual forces which make it impossible to attain an all-out effort.

The easiest of these to understand is the organizational problem. Section 7-a of the Kilgore-Pepper-Tolan bill reflects the dangerously muddled situation it is intended to correct. Under the Office of War Mobilization there would be an Office of Production and Supply. The latter would bring together all agencies having to do with the procurement, production, and financing of war supplies. To this Office of Production and Supply, Section 7-a would transfer the functions and personnel of (1) the War Production Board and the Smaller War Plants Corporation; (2) those subdivisions of the War, Navy, and Treasury departments, of the Maritime Commission, and of the Office of Lend-Lease which have to

do with the procurement and production of war supplies; (3) those subdivisions of the Federal Loan Agency and the Department of Commerce which finance plant expansion and purchase of materials in the war-production program; and (4) the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator, with its diverse duties in connection with the purchase and production of aviation gas and synthetic products.

By taking over the personnel of these various bodies, the new organization could function while changes were being made. The advantage would be in having all production and supply matters under a single authority, thus ending many of the delays from which we suffer. While WPB may initiate a project, the contracts have to be signed by army procurement and the financing has to be obtained from Jesse Jones, and any one of the three may balk at the plans of the others, with no real court of final appeal short of the overburdened White House itself.

The bill would bring all man-power, production, and supply agencies under unified civilian control and impose certain necessary duties on the new agency and its sub-agencies. These duties have been but imperfectly understood, and they cannot be fulfilled without "unity of command" on the home supply front. Section 6-a of the bill, for example, provides for a current inventory of industrial capacity. It provides for a detailed time schedule of end and intermediate military and civilian products, plant by plant. It provides for the allocation of productive resources as well as materials to meet the production program worked out by a top requirements committee on which the Secretaries of War and the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the army, and the Chief of Naval Operations would be represented. It provides for plant inspection to make certain that labor is being used at maximum effectiveness. Today we have no one over-all agency with power to formulate or to carry out a concerted program of this kind, and the lack of one is slowing up our war effort.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the bill is its purpose to make the war-mobilization program more democratic in character and to provide greater freedom within it for men with enterprise and ideas. This is by far the most difficult task of all and the one point at which the bill is incomplete. The bill would end the use of dollar-a-year men. It would give labor and agriculture, as well as business, representation on a top Board of War Mobilization. One of the duties of this board would

be to stimulate the activity of labor-management committees.

But these measures are not enough. The bill ought to provide for a change in the make-up of the materials branches and the industry branches, which necessarily do much of the detail work of the production program. It ought to provide for the representation of labor and small business in these branches. The most interesting and fruitful provisions of the bill in this respect are those which embody Senator Kilgore's proposals for an Office of Technological Mobilization. This agency would have power to force the licensing of patents and secret processes, would promote research on new production methods, and would be able to mobilize our scientific capacity in the war program. Today our scientific agencies are as scattered and overlapping, and as dominated by big business, as are our production agencies. This is serious in a war as dependent as this one on technological efficiency and ingenuity.

In the perspectives of the Tolson bill current shifts at

the WPB seem either trivial or misdirected. The principal effect of the reorganization of the industry branches is to enhance the growing power of Vice-Chairman Ferdinand Eberstadt and to give the armed services new influence within the industry branches. The principal effect of the new "controlled-materials plan," the nineteenth WPB effort of its kind, is to increase the power of the army, which is now the dominant influence at the WPB and has thoroughly demonstrated its incapacity for the tasks of industrial mobilization. The current effort is to cut production quotas to fit scarcities of materials. A harder task is to increase the output of materials, particularly of the three "controlled materials"—steel, aluminum, and copper. This requires readiness to recognize the value of labor's suggestions in these fields and to fight monopoly obstructions to maximum output. Neither Eberstadt—a corporation lawyer, formerly a partner in the brokerage firm of Dillon, Read—nor his chief subordinate in the new setup, Ernest Kanzler, has shown any such capacity.

Was Hull Right About Vichy?

BY ROBERT BENDINER

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S forces have rescued North Africa from the Axis and the State Department from some of its severest critics. The chances are excellent that North Africa will stay rescued, but I am not sure about the State Department. The joy over our first major military success has sent many erstwhile opponents of our Vichy policy scurrying to Canossa, but I have a feeling that when the jubilation dies down they will begin to wonder whether our diplomats had as much to do with it as Cordell Hull would have us believe.

As one who never felt that anything good could come of concessions to fascism, I remain incorrigibly unconvinced by Secretary Hull's contention that our occupation of Morocco and Algiers is the fruit of his two-year courtship of Vichy. It is perhaps early in the day to assess the claim in all its aspects, but even now I believe certain observations are in order.

To begin with, I am rather taken aback by some of the motives which Mr. Hull now ascribes to our Vichy policy. Relations were maintained and food distributed, it seems, only in order that consular and relief agents might have an opportunity to obtain information and to conduct propaganda; the long-range objective was always "to pave the way and prepare the background in the most effective manner possible for the planning and sending of the military expedition into the western

Mediterranean area. . . ." It would be remarkable enough if, in view of the record, our policy toward Vichy actually did rest on a foundation of disingenuousness rather than blindness, but it is even more remarkable for Mr. Hull to be bragging about so sly an approach to diplomacy—particularly in the same week in which new overtures are being made to General Franco. The Secretary's profession of foxiness has a fanciful quality about it, exulting as it does in an amorality which we have condemned in other nations and of which I find it hard to believe we have actually been guilty.

My impression that the State Department has hastily improvised its claim to a lion's share of glory for the North African campaign is reinforced by the conflict between President Roosevelt's several explanations of the move and that of Mr. Hull. The President told the French people that the occupation was designed to head off an immediate threat of an attack by the Axis on this strategic area and that it was decided upon only in June of 1942. Mr. Hull, on the other hand, would have us view it as the secret objective of a policy that was launched with the fall of Paris. I beg leave to doubt that the State Department could have foreseen the military decision of last June a year and a half before we had even entered the war.

On close inspection the five purposes which Secretary Hull claims for the Vichy policy boil down to three

(1) "opportunity for the United States to gain information and territory and of close relations with the Government of Vichy, Germany, and Italy, and to secure the armistice. . . . Some details of the Department's policy are not known. It is understood that the agents and the information obtained from the Free French are ready and much of the information is through and particularly in North Africa. The affected French are now that Mark W. obtained the troop disposition and not made possible. H. some decrease in successful part of the campaign. The land. Indeed, the campaign had no harm. The loss of Ad. in North Africa. Nor should the services of Africa, Vichy agents in the rights of the French people. The French people that the occupation was designed to head off an immediate threat of an attack by the Axis on this strategic area and that it was decided upon only in June of 1942. Mr. Hull, on the other hand, would have us view it as the secret objective of a policy that was launched with the fall of Paris. I beg leave to doubt that the State Department could have foreseen the military decision of last June a year and a half before we had even entered the war. On close inspection the five purposes which Secretary Hull claims for the Vichy policy boil down to three

(1) "opportunity for the government of the United States to get from week to week highly important information virtually from the inside of German-controlled territory and from North Africa"; (2) "maintenance of close relations with the French people and encouragement of leadership in opposition to Hitler"; (3) "constant effort to prevent delivery of the French fleet" to Germany, or any other violation of the terms of the armistice. These points are perhaps worth reviewing in some detail, because they constitute the basis of the department's claim to vindication.

It is undoubtedly true that the handful of diplomatic agents and the twenty men who supervised the distribution of food in North Africa were able to report useful information, but their contribution was small indeed compared with the volume of data which hundreds of Free French sympathizers from Calais to Tunis were ready and willing to impart. Had we broken with Vichy, much of this information would still have been available through any normally functioning espionage system, particularly in view of the prevailing anti-Vichy sentiment in North Africa and the presence of hundreds of disaffected French officers. As a matter of fact, we learn now that it was the daring secret mission of General Mark W. Clark which three weeks before the invasion obtained the vital information as to installations and troop dispositions. It was this Commando-escorted band, and not Mr. Hull's food-distributing observers, who made possible the clock-like precision of the military operation. Honeyed relations with Vichy may have had some deception value, but they also cost us heavily in successful liaison with the Fighting French, who had no part whatever in the first great move to free their homeland. Indeed, General de Gaulle himself knew nothing of the campaign until it was launched, and certainly he had no hand in the selection of General Giraud, much less of Admiral Darlan, to take charge of French affairs in North Africa.

Nor should it be forgotten that while we enjoyed the services of Mr. Hull's observers in France and North Africa, Vichy was able to make similar use of its agents in our own country. Its officials here enjoyed the rights of diplomatic immunity and were in a position to send Laval (read Hitler) any information they thought of value.

Concerning the second major purpose of the Vichy policy, Mr. Hull is not explicit, and I don't see how he could be. Far from encouraging opposition to Hitler, our friendliness toward Vichy, as any Fighting Frenchman will tell you, was in fact one of the greatest obstacles to a crystallization of French resistance to the Axis. It was our decision to support Vichy in the days following the collapse of the French army which discouraged the organization of a Free French government in North Africa. Several high French officers were willing to carry on in

the colonies and were dissuaded from doing so only by the revelation that the great power of the United States was being placed at the disposition of the Vichy government. Late in June, 1940, General Mittelheuser, commander of the French forces in Syria, sent a message to General Noguès in Morocco communicating his willingness to carry on the fight. He was about to send a similar message to the British command at Cairo, offering the support of the French Army of the Near East, when word came through of Washington's determination to deal with the Pétain regime. The General tore up his letter.

Events, I believe, have already exposed the fallacy that it was our Vichy policy that kept the French fleet out of Hitler's hands. If the fleet is not delivered to Germany now, when we not only have broken relations with Vichy but have seized a great part of the French Empire, would a firmer stand with Pétain have induced its surrender before? If a completely occupied and powerless France fails to yield the fleet now, would a France that still had a semblance of a government have handed over this last remnant of its power? It would appear that the French navy has not now, and did not ever have, any intention of abandoning its ships either to Germany or to England. To a considerable extent the rank and file of the fleet has for years had marked political inclinations to the left. Much of it, moreover, was recruited among the traditionally seafaring Bretons, and Brittany has been more solidly anti-Vichy than any other section of France. Many officers, on the other hand, are anti-British and collaborationist, but these professionals have a vested interest in the integrity of the fleet which transcends political considerations. Neither Admiral Leahy, Marshal Pétain, nor Secretary Hull is to be thanked for this fortunate combination of circumstances. Any courting of the Vichy politicians for the purpose of saving the fleet was wasted affection on our side and successful blackmail on theirs.

It is possible to argue that maintaining purely formal relations with Vichy was not incompatible with encouraging resistance to the Axis, but if that was Mr. Hull's intention, it is almost impossible to understand the hostility and resentment that were constantly displayed toward De Gaulle and his movement. If, as Mr. Hull asserts, our policy was aimed at "keeping alive the basic concepts of freedom of the French people," why the undisguised fury over the seizure of St. Pierre and Miquelon by the Free French? It can hardly be argued that this was merely a show put on to prevent a break with Vichy. We could easily have rejected responsibility for Admiral Muselier's move and let it go at that. Events have proved that nothing we could have done short of attacking French territory would have induced Vichy to break off relations with us. But instead of shrugging its shoulders, the State Department did everything possible to restore

the islands to Vichy control. We appeared to be bent on more than merely preserving formal relations so as to have the services of observers. Our Ambassador and his aides went out of their way again and again to demonstrate affection and regard for Pétain and his government—at a time when democratic Frenchmen were fighting in the ranks of the United Nations or dying in concentration camps. How did this "help keep alive the basic concepts of freedom of the French people"?

In the last three months our policy toward Vichy has in truth been more realistic. We suffered relations to continue but at the same time dealt more and more openly with the forces of General de Gaulle and displayed greater contempt for the Marshal's government. Had we followed this policy from the start, I could feel more sympathy with the present contentions of Mr. Hull. The fact is that the cavalier attitude toward Vichy dates from the Roosevelt-Churchill decision to occupy North Africa. The State Department merely followed suit and would now appear to be cashing in on a very good thing.

I know that it will seem ungracious in the midst of this first great victory to begrudge any part of the gov-

ernment its share of credit, and I write this with no pleasure. If this war were a great sporting event it might perhaps be better to forget the past and give the diplomats the benefit of the doubt. But this is not the Rose Bowl game, and the department's present position contains implications for the future. If the appeasement of Vichy is to be put down as a success, there will be more appeasement to come. Opposition to such a policy is not a principle which can be lightly relinquished. If forty diplomacy justifies the support of a Pétain as against a De Gaulle, I fear we shall shore up other Pétains. We are in fact doing that very thing in Madrid at this moment. I shudder to think of this kind of "cleverness" at the peace table.

Our Vichy policy is merely one chapter in a long history of appeasement. It must be judged in that context and not merely as a piece of diplomacy which did in fact precede a successful invasion of North Africa. Some day the forces of the United Nations will invade Germany, and in that happy hour I hope we shall not be asked to believe that the triumphal entry was planned at the Munich conference.

New Deal for Stockholders

BY MAURICE H. GREENBERGER

THE Securities and Exchange Commission has trained its guns on the greatest citadel of oligarchy in this democratic nation—the management and control of corporations. Since the action of the commission can hardly be called spectacular in these days of world-shaking military events, it will probably not receive the public attention and support that it deserves, though we can be sure that it will meet all the opposition of which corporation officers and their spokesmen are capable.

The problem is not a new one. It has been the subject of discussion and study for many years. Everyone knows that the control of our corporations, and particularly of the giant companies that dominate the country's economic activity, is not actually in the hands of the majority of the stockholders. At one time "trust busting" was popularly thought to be the remedy for corporate evils. It is now understood that the principal problem created by the giant corporations arises not from bigness, which it is often in the public interest to preserve, but from the separation of control from ownership. This was clearly demonstrated by A. A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means in "The Modern Corporation and Private Property."

In the days of the small entrepreneur, employing a handful of workmen, the owner of the establishment was

also the active controlling and managing force. With the expansion of enterprise, the corporation was found to be the most suitable form for industrial and financial activity. As long as corporations were relatively small, the law that dealt with them—John Marshall spoke of their "artificial being, invisible and intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law"—was comparatively satisfactory. But today, when they are larger and richer than some states, that body of law is greatly in need of re-examination and revision. The impact of corporations on our lives and even on the very safety of the nation—witness, for example, the Standard Oil-I. G. Farben affair and the rubber situation—is too substantial for us to be content with a body of corporation law made for phantoms and conceptual creatures.

Theoretically, the stockholders exercise the right of control through their rights to attend stockholders' meetings, to vote on certain vital matters, and to elect directors. However, these rights are more formal than real. In many instances the stockholder is deprived of the corporate franchise through such oligarchic devices as the issuance of non-voting stock, voting trusts, denial of the right to maintain fractional interests, and the holding company. But the commonest method of keeping control out of the hands of the majority—and it is a method

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whereby the board room pays lip service to democracy—is to be found in the perversion of the proxy system.

A survey made recently by the Temporary National Economic Committee showed that of 14,000,000 record shareholdings, about 7,500,000, or 54 per cent, had a value of \$500 or less; about 2,000,000, a value of between \$501 and \$1,000; and about 3,000,000, a value of between \$1,001 and \$5,000. In other words, approximately 90 per cent of the record shareholdings were of a value of \$5,000 or less. These are scattered throughout the country, and it is obvious that a stockholder whose interest is comparatively so small cannot make an annual trip to the stockholders' meeting, which is often at a great distance from his home.

To these stockholders the controlling group sends a proxy form, which is usually returned executed. This act of "control" on the part of the stockholder is facilitated even to the extent of the prepayment of postage. No more cerebration is required of the stockholder than he would need to mark a */a* ballot. If the corporation is listed on a national exchange, the management must mail proxies at the request of any stockholder of record who wishes to set up an opposition. But while the corporation pays for the printing, postage, and other incidental expenses incurred in its solicitation of approving proxy certificates, a group of stockholders in opposition must bear these expenses themselves. As a result, the task of forming a corporate opposition—except in cases of flagrant mismanagement which might excite the support of a great number of stockholders—rests upon a few individuals who are willing to be economic crusaders and able to expend time, money, and effort for the corporate good, in most cases with slight assurance of success. The changes in the rules concerning the solicitation of proxies which the SEC proposes are designed to enable the stockholders to exercise a more effective control of management.

Much has been written about the corporate entity. In the eyes of the law this artificial creature is the owner of the corporate property and assets as against even the stockholders themselves, who constitute the corporation. For some purposes in the law it is a person, and for others it is not a person. However, if the matter is viewed in the light of our prevailing philosophy of private property, the assets and property of the corporation *do* belong to the stockholders. A great number of these stockholders at one time in our economic development would have been individual owners of small productive enterprises. Today they are part owners of our corporate giants by virtue of having purchased shares of stock or insurance policies or through deposits in savings banks. By such participation, *theirs* are the railroads, the steel mills, the meat-packing houses, the insurance companies, and a host of other enterprises.

The SEC says that in the corporations subject to its jurisdiction a stockholder will hereafter have the right to submit proposals to his fellow-stockholders together with a one-hundred-word explanation of the action he wishes to sponsor. The security holder is also to be given the opportunity to nominate candidates for directorships, and these nominees are to be placed in ballot form on the proxy. In its summary of the proposed revision of the rules the commission states that "some managements have adopted procedures which encourage signature in blank rather than execution of the ballot" for each proposal submitted to the stockholders. The rules are to be amended to permit the counting of only those proxies which indicate specifically the action to be taken, thus preventing the arrogation of authority through default. These are the more important changes. Other provisions require the disclosure of compensation in excess of \$25,000, of directors' and officers' dealings with the corporation, and of the company's activities during the preceding year.

The action of the SEC is an attempt to reform the proxy system, which in the words of Chairman Purcell "has been sadly prostituted." The commission is undoubtedly wise to devote its attention to the proxy device as a means of stimulating more intelligent stockholder expression. But the jurisdiction of the SEC is limited. Add the fact that companies may incorporate in any of the forty-eight states even though their activities are nation-wide and they are indispensable units of interstate commerce, and the conclusion is inescapable that a federal code of corporate morality is necessary to cope with the problem. Many states are only too eager to attract enterprises which seek legal sanction for undemocratic structures and practices.

Since in an economy of bigness the stockholder cannot be brought to his corporation, his corporation must be brought to him. It is suggested that federal legislation be passed which would facilitate the expression of stockholders' views by dividing them into regional groups. This idea might contain the answer to the problem of minority and management control. The country would be divided into corporate districts, like the Federal Reserve districts. In each of these districts would be located a district office of the company, and at this office a list of the record stockholders should be available, to encourage communication among them. Also there should be periodic district meetings at which directors representing the district would be elected; these directors ought to have a voting power equal to the value of the securities they represent. At district meetings the representative-director should be required to explain to his constituents the activities of the corporation, and orderly discussion and debate should be encouraged. This or a similar plan would be more effective in arousing and maintaining stockholder interest than

formidable proxy forms containing necessarily technical data.

It is doubtful whether democratic capitalism can survive if the power of industrial and financial property is abdicated to economic despots, however benevolent or paternalistic they may be. Some democratic technique for

corporate control must be discovered. Preventive control in corporate council halls is more desirable than punitive disapproval in the courtroom. Unless we can establish industrial and financial democracy, freedom of enterprise for the few will prove to be destructive of all the freedoms for the rest of us.

"The End of the Beginning"

BY DONALD W. MITCHELL

THE best news in several months of war is now coming out of North Africa as the British and American armies, driving west and east, threaten to destroy the German hold on Libya, together with the entire Afrika Korps. For the first time in the Western theater of the war we have seized the initiative and are forcing the enemy to meet our battle plans rather than attempting with slight success to meet his.

Today's news flashes must be seen in perspective if their importance is to be appreciated. Rommel's victory in Libya in early summer and the fall of Tobruk were shocking blows to the United Nations cause, especially since they were achieved against defenders markedly superior in man-power, armor, artillery, and airplanes—everything, in fact, but tactics and leadership. The failure of Hitler quickly to reinforce his able lieutenant may have been the result of his inability to spare the necessary men and supplies from Russia, but it has proved extremely expensive for him. The Germans became mired in the desert, with their long transportation lines pounded by the greatly superior Allied air force and their overseas communications under attack from British submarines. Meanwhile the British curbed the individualism of the R. A. F., found a better commander, and rebuilt their superiority in all arms.

With complete air dominance, naval cooperation, and both bigger and better-equipped armored forces, there was no sound military reason why the British should not have won. Yet they have lost battles in the present war when the advantage was almost as definitely theirs. Victory in Egypt is therefore a cause for satisfaction. It is even more gratifying to note the immense improvement in British tactics over earlier campaigns. Profiting from past disasters, the Army of the Nile used infantry well supported by artillery to prepare paths through the German and Italian mine fields and then sent in its tanks to exploit developed weaknesses on both flanks. Axis mistakes in anticipating the striking point proved costly. The outflanked troops were compelled to fall back along a narrow front under heavy artillery fire and merciless strafing from American and British planes,

and several divisions, mainly advanced Italian units which had been acting as shock absorbers, were entirely cut off by the swiftly moving steel tentacles. Rightly refusing to pause to deal with these nearly helpless units, General Montgomery pursued the main German armored divisions, exploiting to the utmost the advantage afforded him by his superior tanks and aviation.

Notable as Montgomery's successes have been, the African campaign would still be a secondary one but for other recent events. Because Rommel threatened vital British positions, any marked advance of his army was serious, but British drives into Libya menaced nothing of equal importance to Hitler. Even if they had conquered the whole province, the Allies would not have found it much easier to send supplies through the Mediterranean as long as the enemy's air bases in Sicily blocked the road and no counter-bases were available.

It is the American invasion of Morocco and Algeria and its synchronization with British moves which give North Africa great strategic importance at present. The success of either the British or the American drive alone offers no tremendous threat to Hitler, but success in both will not only eliminate Rommel but affect immeasurably the whole course of the war.

The American campaign makes use of one Allied asset which has not previously played a decisive role, namely, British naval command of the extreme western Mediterranean. The base at Gibraltar and the western Mediterranean fleet have discouraged any Italian desire to send raiders out of the Mediterranean and have aided convoys to get through to Malta but have otherwise been of slight value. These ships, completely dominant in their area, covered American landings.

Though the army's press releases have been a great improvement over those of the navy, too little information is available to permit any adequate commentary on our work in this area so far. With sea and air superiority it was not surprising that we could establish bridgeheads, apparently with little loss. The use of American rather than British troops and the vigorous propaganda campaign which accompanied American landings doubtless

helped to weaken French resistance, which was not as vigorous as might have been expected from the large number of troops in the country, though of course their morale and equipment were poor. Early conquest of airfields greatly aided our cause. Later news may dictate a different view of the campaign, but present evidence shows careful planning, skilful coordination of sea, air, and ground forces, and aggressive leadership.

Several counter-moves are open to Hitler. He may be able to force Franco to change from an inactive to a belligerent ally, in which case the more than 100,000 soldiers in Spanish Morocco would offer a definite threat to the American rear and Gibraltar could be attacked by land. He can strive, despite inevitable heavy losses, to send strong reinforcements to Rommel. Or he can complicate our supply problems by a concentrated U-boat attack on Allied shipping lanes to Africa. Or, finally, he can write off Africa as a bad bet and redouble efforts against Russia, hoping for the unlikely decisive victory which would permit him to withdraw troops from the east in time to meet any really damaging attack launched from the south and west.

There are few indications that the last course is even being considered. Concern for his prestige, if nothing else, is apt to make Hitler determined to redress his fortunes in Africa. The occupation of all France and the dispatch of air units to Tunis are signs of this. Hitler cannot afford to treat the African campaign in its present stage as secondary. Allied success here will (1) eliminate the use of French bases by German and Italian submarines; (2) plug the largest of the few remaining leaks in the British blockade of Continental Europe; (3) effectively isolate Dakar and pave the way for an assault there by land should it become expedient; (4) provide badly needed combat experience for American troops; (5) bolster American civilian morale; (6) enable the Allies to set up a string of naval and air bases along the Mediterranean from which southern France, Italy, and Greece can be steadily harassed by naval, air, and commando raids. Axis defenses in this region, unlike those of northern France, will require a great deal of strengthening to become even relatively secure.

Conquest of North Africa will also free the British of the necessity of keeping large naval squadrons at both ends of the Mediterranean. In narrow waters airplanes can to a certain degree serve as cheaper substitutes for ships, especially in warding off attack on transportation. More Allied sea power will therefore be made available either for convoy duty or for use against Japan in the Pacific, in both of which spheres it is badly needed. With a protecting umbrella of air power it should be possible to reestablish the Mediterranean "life line" close to the African coast. This route cannot be made perfectly safe—especially south of Sicily it will remain hazardous—but since the shortening of the route to the Near East will

save both time and shipping, some losses can be borne with equanimity. Even the Soviet Union can receive supplies by rail across Syria and Mesopotamia much more quickly than by the enormously long Persian Gulf route and more safely than via Murmansk.

Of course these are possibilities which cannot be fully realized before several months at least, or even a year. Despite Axis knowledge that an attack was impending we gained some of the advantages of surprise, for with many objectives to guard, Hitler had to await our attack before committing himself to defensive measures. The speed with which we continue to exploit this advantage in the weeks ahead is therefore of vital importance.

Exhilarated by our seizure of the initiative, many commentators have overlooked certain negative aspects of the task before us. Whatever answer Hitler makes—and an attack through Spain would offer a first-class threat—an African front will, for a time, make enormous requirements on merchant shipping and naval escorts. And it has been off the West and Northwest African coast that submarines have scored most of their recent successes. For several months to come this drain on an already insufficient pool of merchant tonnage is almost certain to end German worries over the launching of a front elsewhere. To some extent the African offensive may also be robbing Peter to pay Paul, since its demands on Allied air power have caused a lessening of raids over Germany in the past few weeks.

Our methods in Africa can best be described as cautious, but the word is not used in a critical sense. The invasion of Algeria and Morocco comes under the heading of what the author has described in earlier issues of *The Nation* as "small-scale offensives," aimed at definite but limited objectives and made feasible by their distance from the centers of German military power. In no correct sense of the term is it a full-scale "second front." In the September 5 *Nation* I offered the view that a large-scale invasion of Western Europe was impracticable at the time because of lack of men and ships. This view was recently confirmed by the President. The present operations probably represent the maximum land effort that the United States can make under present transport limitations. They have a splendid chance of complete success. But the campaign's very distance from Germany is also its greatest drawback. For it does not offer a grave *immediate* threat to Hitler. Even should it be entirely successful, a shift of the garrison division in Western Europe, without the recall of any large number of units from the Russian front, should be adequate to meet the menace it offers.

The best analysis yet made of the current African situation came from Winston Churchill, and it is one which over-optimistic Americans should take to heart. "This is not the end or the beginning of the end," he said, "but the end of the beginning."

Talking of India

BY KINGSLEY MARTIN

I HAVE heard of Englishmen who think India none of America's business and who object to the constant stream of criticism and suggestion now made about India in the United States. Now that the United States is in the war, I can see no justification for such complaints; all problems that affect the conduct of the war and the application of the Atlantic Charter are legitimately the affair of all the members of the United Nations. But if that goes for the Indian question, it also goes for the Negro question, and for all the other problems of race and color and religion that are involved in a global war and a global peace.

Of course there are difficulties and responsibilities involved in this joint discussion of problems that used to be regarded as the internal affairs of particular nations. Americans are legitimately cross when challenged about the Negro question on the basis of ignorance, and I must confess to an impatience with American critics of British policy in India who imagine that the Indian Congress is an elected body similar to the elected body of the same name in Washington, who argue about a solution for India without having even heard of Pakistan, and who completely forget, in demanding freedom for Indians, to inquire into the interests of the depressed classes or of other minorities. I really believe that many who are vehement about India have in their minds an analogy with eighteenth-century America. They ask why Britain does not "quit India," oblivious of the fact that at the present time all the Indian parties, including Congress, agree in wanting Britain to defend India. Some knowledge, I suggest, is a necessary basis for the discussion of any subject, even of British imperialism.

As an anti-imperialist myself, I have a certain nose for the hypocrisies of imperialists, and I am not deceived by the excuses put forward by people whose real desire is simply to hold on to power. Similarly I recognize among the various types of Britain's critics some who are not inspired by genuine liberalism. I can take anything from informed critics who care about the liberty they demand. But sometimes I detect not so much an interest in India or in winning the war for the United Nations as a groping toward an alternative imperialism that might easily prove no more decent and liberal than Britain's.

Having got these warnings and complaints off my chest, I add that they do not, to my mind, apply to Mr. Wendell Willkie's broadcast, which was carefully and usefully phrased, or to the article by Louis Fischer in *The Nation*. On some points I disagree with Fischer, but

I know that he formed his views after the most elaborate inquiries in India and that it is a sincere and informed opinion. Louis Fischer has been a good friend of mine for many years, and I was not at all surprised to find that he had been captivated by Gandhi. He is an enthusiast by nature and instinctively a libertarian. It was on grounds of liberty that he finally abandoned his long championship of Stalin's policy in the Soviet Union. He was certain to take a Hindu against a British view. I have seen some of his voluminous notes; he took the trouble in the extreme heat of the Indian plains to type out as far as possible verbatim everything that passed in his numerous conversations with high British officials and soldiers as well as with Indian leaders of many shades of opinion. If he made, as I think, a serious mistake in interpretation, that was not due to lack of pains in acquiring information. But if he had tried more strenuously to find a constructive solution in the terribly difficult setting of the war, I believe that his conclusions would have been less clear-cut and possibly more useful.

Let me explain. The sting of Fischer's articles was the charge that the offer which Sir Stafford Cripps carried to India was not sincerely intended. That there were some in official positions who never believed in the Cripps mission is, of course, clear, and that Mr. Churchill has never changed his youthful mind about India is an inescapable deduction from his recent speeches. But if Fischer had been able to seek evidence in England as well as in India and had talked with Sir Stafford Cripps and those who accompanied him on his mission, he would not, I think, have explained the breakdown of the Cripps negotiations by a simple charge of Whitehall sabotage.

I wish the British government had been willing to go farther in the offer made to India for the immediate war period. With the war close to their own doors, it was natural that the Indian leaders should pay less attention to post-war promises than to the question of an immediate increase in power. Sir Stafford went to India at his own instance; he was the spokesman of the British Cabinet and an old friend of India, in particular of Jawaharlal Nehru. He seemed more likely than anyone else to persuade the leaders of the chief parties in India to make up their minds to work together and with Great Britain in the defense of India. He offered an Indianized and representative Viceroy's Council instead of an official and hand-picked Council. He had no authority to offer a National Government during the war. But he could legiti-

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"Compulsory Democracy"

A MOST interesting report that came out of France just before it was entirely taken over by Hitler described the work of some fifteen Study Groups, representing a cross-section of French life, which have been meeting for the purpose of formulating a program for the future government of their country. We have heard a great deal about the courageous acts of sabotage and political warfare directed against the Nazi invaders, but very little is known of the discussions going on in occupied countries concerning plans for a future free Europe. The report of the fifteen Study Groups sheds light on the sort of political and social structure which the Europe of today is looking forward to for the morrow.

These fifteen groups came out of the very soil of France. Among their members were conservatives and radicals, Socialists and Communists, factory workers and university professors, farmers, former municipal employees, and often the pastor of the village, sometimes a Catholic, sometimes a Protestant. The groups met "underground" in spite of all the difficulties of the occupation and the watchfulness of the Gestapo. They took up for discussion concrete subjects, political and economic. And the plans that emerged from these deliberations

were sent to London and submitted to General de Gaulle's National Committee, which in turn sent back to France suggestions to be considered by the Study Groups. At the same time the groups, by employing considerable ingenuity, managed to send outlines of their conclusions to anti-fascist cells in Belgium, Holland, and other occupied countries with a view to creating a common program for a future free united Europe.

The plans stipulate, it is interesting to note, that prior to any work of reconstruction there must be promulgated a new Declaration of the Rights of Man, to be based on a single fundamental concept: that the people shall have every liberty except the right to deny liberty. This applies both to the international and the national sphere. For example, no nation may carry its right to independence and sovereignty to the extreme of constituting itself a fascist state which by its mere existence would threaten the peace and liberty of Europe. In the internal sphere, no party with dictatorial tendencies will be tolerated. Not only will a party be outlawed which advocates a corporative system such as Doriot tried to organize with the cooperation of the Nazi rulers, but every party must choose its directing body and arrive at its decisions by strictly democratic methods. Never again

HITLER IS STILL THERE

Delivered at the moment when the American army was accomplishing one of the most remarkable exploits of the war, Hitler's speech of November 8 fell on ears which were predisposed to take it as his swan song. Two phrases combined to give it the tone of a confession of defeat: his ill-timed declaration that he wouldn't "go abroad" like his royal predecessor and his outcry, "there is only one thing left and that is battle." Those words were seized upon by nearly every radio analyst and every editorial writer as proof that Hitler now felt himself beaten.

A reading of the whole speech in a less emotional atmosphere would have led to a more restrained interpretation. Apart from those two phrases Hitler did not talk like a defeated dictator. On the contrary, his words breathed defiance and determination. He pointed to the unchallenged fact of his vast conquests and said, "Whatever we possess, we hold actually and firmly, and nobody gets a place where we already are" (forgetting

Libya for the moment). He said his last peace offer had been made. He described the vast gains made in the Russian campaign—and Russia's losses in sources of vital supplies. He said he would "anticipate every move of the enemy."

His acts support this interpretation of his words. Only two days were needed to prove that the brutal initiative which has characterized him in the past has not been abandoned. On Saturday the American troops landed in North Africa. On Tuesday Vichy's incapacity to resist the American invasion had become fully evident. On Wednesday Hitler occupied Vichy, marched through the rest of France, and attacked in Tunisia. His acts, like his words, showed neither the uncertainty nor the slowness of defeat. They showed an enemy who still is there, full of strength and will; an enemy who can be defeated only by effort and planning, by tanks and men, and not least by peoples and ideas; an enemy who can be defeated only by combined military and political war.

will France permit such a degrading spectacle as was presented by the Radical Socialist Party in 1933, when, on the eve of the opening of the party convention, all the undesirables of the neighborhood were rounded up and seated as members and then permitted to vote on vital questions of French policy. The new France will permit all the rights that a free man can desire, but not the right to practice fascism, under any guise. This concept has been referred to as "compulsory democracy."

This new idea of compulsory democracy is pushing its way into the thinking of the occupied countries of Europe, which have learned by bitter experience the futility of any attempt to conciliate fascism. Of the same order of ideas are the tentative plans drawn up by the Study Groups for a government that will be both representative and strong. They recognize the need, especially during the transition period, of a government which can take a firmer stand against all the elements threatening liberty and order. They realize that the alternative to a dictatorship on the one hand or chaos and civil war on the other is a government, popularly elected,

in which the executive can act swiftly and decisively.

In view of recent developments in North Africa, it is of great interest to examine the position of the Study Groups in regard to the so-called transition period. Many people talk as though all Europe, the conquered countries as well as the aggressors, would have to undergo a period of military occupation. This suggestion is strongly repudiated. Far from believing that France must live under the control of an Allied army of occupation, these groups assume that independent governing bodies will be set up while the struggle for liberation goes on. As soon as a single department of France is free from Nazi control, the French authorities will take over and the French people will begin to rule themselves. It would be a mistake for the Allied armies to interfere in any way with the internal forces of the liberated country. It is highly encouraging that the Americans in their occupation of North Africa promise to act in a way that corresponds to the thinking of the French Study Groups in regard to this last important point.

A Gallup Poll of Blood

BY PAUL HAGEN

OUT of the night of Germany comes a Gallup poll of blood. Incontrovertibly, it reveals the specific difficulties the Nazis are encountering at home on the eve of their fourth winter of war.

This Gallup poll is provided by the list of people executed in Germany. Another longer list continues to grow in the occupied territories. But recently the roster of those officially beheaded in Germany proper has been expanding. Not that the Nazis had not murdered at home before. There has always been quiet liquidation of individuals; there have been celebrated purges. Last year the spotlight of home propaganda was turned on several model executions—humble radio listeners, black marketeers, and defeatists. That was in the days when the myth of Hitler's invincibility was to break down for the first time, before Moscow. But the consequent purge of the High Command and the reorganization in high places were not followed by increased terror against the people. On the contrary, Nazi propagandists uttered words of understanding for the strains they had to endure. This year, however, while the second offensive on the Russian front was being frustrated at Stalingrad, the executioner at home took up his work. And we have the first reports of local mutinies and of firing squads against soldiers. But let us analyze such evidence as is available.

For the month of September we have a list of persons

officially executed, in some cases with ages as well as names and with court charges and sentences. This list of fifty is of course not complete, nor is it, as we shall see, reliable in every detail. Here is a rough outline of it, as put together from B. B. C. broadcasts, from the press, and from clandestine stations like "Weimar," which quote, in some instances, from local German newspapers and radio reports: *Frankfort*, five persons executed—charge, high treason, attempts to organize "Communist cells," dissemination of foreign radio news; *Mannheim*, fourteen persons—charge, organization of a new party nucleus to undermine the German home front and the army, dissemination of enemy radio news; *Oldenburg*, one man—espionage for a foreign power; *Breslau*, two armament workers—acts of sabotage; *Berlin*, two persons, one a twenty-one-year-old girl—espionage; *Munich*, one man—high treason and attempted aid to the enemy; *Bochum* and *Schwerte*, ten workers—charge, unknown; *Kassel*, a middle-aged couple—after serving prison terms for treasonable acts, they again upon release listened to foreign broadcasts and spread enemy news; *Berlin*, an artist and a clergyman—listening to foreign broadcasts; *Erdingen*, a young worker—high treason; *Nürnberg*, a man who had been in a concentration camp for Communist activities—charged with resumption of these activities; *Austria: Vienna*, three persons, one a woman—high treason, undermining the German

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armed forces; *Krems*, two workers—Communist activities; *Graz*, a number of persons—formation of a Communist organization.

There has been some confusion in recording this list, owing to discrepancies in Nazi official announcements. It is a preliminary and only approximate record, but several facts about it are worth noting. First, it is the longest list of official executions in any one month since the Nazis came to power. Second, it is predominantly a list of men and women active in the former labor movement. Third, a large part of the group comes from bombed areas around Mannheim, Frankfurt, and Ludwigshafen. The number of executions reported for this western industrial area is striking; that discontent is showing itself in the form of riots in bombed districts is also confirmed from other sources. To raise the bogey of "growing bolshevism" in these areas may have been one of the purposes of publicizing the executions.

The validity of the Nazi charge that the victims were underground reorganizers of the Communist Party may best be judged by the Mannheim cases. Here is the list of the fourteen victims. It has been checked in New York with people from Mannheim who knew them: Georg Lechleitner, aged fifty-seven; Jakob Faulhaber, aged forty-two; Rudolf Langendorf, forty-seven; Ludwig Molderzyk, forty-three; Anton Kurz, thirty-six; Eugen Siegel, thirty-nine; Philip Brunner, seventy-five; Max Winterthaler, forty; Robert Schmoll, thirty-nine; Rudolf Moll, forty; Daniel Salzinger, forty-five; Käthe Veit (née Brunner), forty-eight; Adolf Veit, forty-nine; Johann Kupka, forty-two. Only Georg Lechleitner was a local official of the pre-Hitler Communist Party. None of the others were Communists. They were members of the Socialist youth movement, the Social Democratic Party, and the free trade unions. For years the center of the group had been the unhappy Brunner family—seventy-five-year-old Philip Brunner, his daughter, Käthe Veit, and his son-in-law, Adolf Veit. The father, a labor veteran, a survivor of the persecutions under Bismarck, was one of the faithful functionaries of the old Social Democratic Party; his daughter had organized a *Naturfreunde* youth group after the last war. They and their friends were critical of many of the policies of their party during the Weimar period, but they were faithful to it. Party lines of course no longer exist in underground Germany, though the old traditions are still strong; people simply work together, try to hold out, and prepare for a new movement. The Nazi label "Communist" must be taken as a weapon in the war of nerves at home—the Nazis will call a Catholic bishop a Bolshevik if they want to destroy him—and in the new appeasement drive directed toward certain quarters in Europe.

We should be only too happy to be able to say that the executions prove the existence of strong underground

organizations, of an effective revival of anti-Nazi activity. Unfortunately, we cannot do so. There may be a new movement in embryo, but we do not know. In view of the age of the victims it is even possible that their names were chosen at random from lists of subversive persons prepared long ago, and that they were executed merely for propaganda purposes.

This has been done in Norway and France. However, this can be said: the Mannheim executions show where the Nazis find the greatest potential danger on the home front. Look at the list again. The youngest of the Mannheim victims was thirty-six, the eldest seventy-five, the bulk of the group between forty and fifty. This is the present age of the old guard of the former labor movement. The Mannheim executions, like most of the others, make it clear that the Nazis, knowing the home front, knowing the growing unrest, know also whom they must present as alleged conspirators—the men and women from whom the public might expect resistance. In short, having denied in so many boisterous speeches that they are afraid of a repetition of 1918, the Nazis are afraid of exactly that. The Gallup poll of blood has very little relation to the specific charges of the courts, but—particularly when compared with last year's record—it proves that, in the opinion of the Nazis, the danger of fundamental changes at home is growing. A dozen times in the past the Nazis have assured the public that they had wiped out the anti-Nazis; they now demonstrate that they did not believe what they said. That is why the heads of potential leaders roll again.

Innocent men and women are not yet being executed in masses in Germany as they are in occupied Europe. Murder at home is still in slow motion compared with the horrifying tempo abroad. The important news is that there is no longer a difference of principle between the Nazis' defense at home and their defense against the opposition in the conquered countries. One of the best illustrations of this is afforded by the executions that followed the assassination of Heydrich. According to figures compiled by the Swedish Göteborg *Handels-Tidning*, 1,103 people were executed at that time. We have learned since that the investigations conducted by the Gestapo, though officially confined to Czechoslovakia, were in reality pursued even more thoroughly in Germany—on German railways, in German homes,



Heinrich Himmler

in German military headquarters and soldiers' barracks. There is a report of a mass purge shortly after Heydrich was shot, in the famous Lichterfeld barracks in Berlin, the scene of the purge of Röhm's followers in June, 1934.

This is a situation with which the United Nations should reckon in formulating a strategy of political warfare.

Behind the Enemy Line

BY ARGUS

IN THE fourth year of the war life is hard for German civilians. Rations have not yet been reduced to the smallest amount that man can live on—they are much larger than the unbelievably small allowances of the Italians—but the situation is pretty bad. The greatest lack, that of fats, can be only half compensated for by the carbohydrates of potatoes, which are somewhat more plentiful. The deficiency of proteins—meat, fish, eggs, cheese—cannot be made up and is calamitous; even the class which is allotted the best ration, the so-called "hardest workers," do not get the minimum necessary for health. And not only is food scarce but also heat, and means of transportation, and above all the consumers' goods which no household can get along without. To illustrate: many of the cheaper restaurants are now asking their guests to bring their own knife, fork, and spoon. These precious articles are so unobtainable that customers are carrying away the restaurants' equipment.

Depressing as these privations are, the thing that is most dreaded has not yet happened. In Germany the worst economic catastrophe that can be conceived is inflation. On this subject the average German is both a neurotic and an expert. Inflation for him is not just an abstract idea; its mechanics are no mystery to him. In that hellish time when the mark fell to a trillionth of its normal value the present generation learned all about its workings.

Since the beginning of Hitler's rule, therefore, the specter of another inflation has been an ever-present source of anxiety. It has worried even the government, which realizes that nothing must happen to alarm a hypersensitive nation on this score. Up to now the danger has been successfully avoided. Prices on the whole have remained surprisingly stationary. And there is no use denying that a people abnormally wise about inflation has posted this on the credit side of the Nazi ledger.

For our part we might learn a good deal by studying the Nazi technique for keeping inflation at bay. And oddly enough we could also profit from observing the government's handling of the people in this matter. For on questions of money and inflation the government knows that it cannot fool the public, and it speaks to it frankly, reasonably, and to the point.

To stimulate saving, it announced a savings week for the beginning of November. There is a lesson for us in the way the necessity of saving was impressed on the people. Savings notes in Germany are of course the equivalent of our war bonds, but they were not played up as the best and highest-paying investment in the world. A much grimmer argument was used. Expounding a scientific and merciless theory of inflation, government spokesmen said in effect: It is essential that you make yourselves still less able to buy things than you now are. You must voluntarily withdraw from use an additional portion of your income and freeze it for the duration of the war. Too much money is in circulation, and too few goods are to be had. That is the wellspring of inflation, and we must plug it up more tightly than can be done through taxes alone. Herr Lange, the vice-president of the Reichsbank, used these words in a widely circulated appeal: "Every reasonable man will understand that as the production of war materials rises, total income also rises, while the supply of consumers' goods steadily falls—that is, purchasing power increases out of proportion to the amount of goods that can be bought. All our anti-inflation measures aim to draw off this surplus purchasing power. Only in this way can depreciation of the currency be prevented."

In this country we seldom hear people urged to save on these grounds. "Save in order to go without"—it sounds like poor propaganda. But it is the one effective defense against inflation in Germany. Only the brutal truth will have any influence on an informed people. Perhaps the struggle against inflation will succeed only among a people that can understand the brutal truth.

It is another question whether his public believed in the rosier future which the Reichsbank chief went on to paint. After the war, he said, you can enjoy the fruits of your savings. "After the war we will manufacture consumers' goods to correspond to the money saved during the war. Victory will make it possible for us to satisfy very quickly and at reasonable prices, the demand for goods that has been dammed up for so long." It is more than doubtful whether a perspective of the future which presupposes victory is confidently accepted in Germany. That is an argument which Americans seeking to combat a future inflation could use with better effect.

Poor De Gaulle

IT WAS to be expected that the North African expedition would be hailed by the Axis press and radio as an act of American imperialist aggression, but a novel twist was introduced by one Axis commentator when he quoted a Paris newspaper as saying, "American piracy has not honored De Gaulle's sergeant-majors with the chance to share the glory of the Moroccan-Algerian raid. General Eisenhower and his gold-stripers have gobbled up all the crumbs themselves."

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mately explain in private conversation that if the party leaders accepted the immediate offer and formed a strong Indian Council, it would in practice be impossible for the Viceroy to precipitate a series of internal crises by refusing to take its advice, even if he should wish to do so. Given that the communal issues were not raised during the war and that the supreme direction of the war was in the hands of a British commander-in-chief—provisions that excited no controversy—could not the leaders of the great Indian parties agree to serve in a Council which, Sir Stafford suggested, would in the course of daily business become a responsible Cabinet, just as the British Cabinet had in practice, and without legislative change, gradually taken over the once autocratic powers of the King of England? If his proposals were accepted, Sir Stafford's influence in Indian matters would in fact be supreme; he would personally do all in his power to insure that the Viceroy's veto atrophied just as the King of England's veto has atrophied. Exactly how Sir Stafford put this point we cannot, of course, know, but that he urged these considerations is clear. As Fischer points out, Sir Stafford would scarcely have sanctioned without demur the publication by Congress of the statement that he had given such an assurance unless the account given by Congress were substantially correct. Nor is Sir Stafford to be criticized for thus in informal conversation going beyond the letter of his instructions. I believe he was right in saying that if the Indian leaders had accepted his proposals, they might in practice have made themselves the effective government of India.

After the completion of discussions that mainly turned on the functions of an Indian Minister of Defense, there seemed an excellent prospect of settlement. The hopes of April 8 were abruptly ended next day. Louis Fischer attributes this disaster to a telegram which, he alleges, Sir Stafford Cripps received from Whitehall. This has been flatly denied. This particular telegram is not in my view of great importance. We know that there was much telegraphing and telephoning between Britain and India that night, and the next day, when Sir Stafford was asked to give a formal assurance of a new convention between the Viceroy and the new Council, he was only in a position to refer Congress to the Viceroy. Fischer is wrong in thinking that any telegram Sir Stafford received would substantiate a charge of breach of faith, for Sir Stafford had never been authorized to make any offer that formally reduced the Viceroy's powers, and if Congress asked him to state in set terms what had been no more than an informal and personal assurance, it could not have expected anything but a negative reply. Personally, I must regret that Sir Stafford had not the support of the Viceroy and the British government in his effort to ease negotiations by an unwritten promise that the convention governing the relation of the Viceroy to his Council

would be changed once the Cripps proposals were accepted. Certainly, as Fischer says, powerful interests in Britain and India opposed the transference of power which Cripps hoped to achieve. But this transference of power during the war was never offered by the British government; therefore the offer could not be withdrawn. The question then arises why Congress should have asked for an open statement of an assurance that was by its nature personal and informal. The fact that they asked for a formal change that they knew from Sir Stafford the government would not grant suggests that they, like some conservative elements in Whitehall and Delhi, were afraid that the negotiations might succeed.

It is the part played by the divisions and weaknesses of Congress that Louis Fischer overlooked. Would Congress have been satisfied even if it had been formally assured that the Viceroy's veto would not be used? I am by no means certain. I do not mean that it might still have been difficult to settle terms of cooperation with Jinnah and the Moslem League. (I do not think Jinnah could have held out and wrecked the settlement if Congress had accepted.) Nor am I worried by indications that Congress would also have raised questions about the position of the princes. Why should it not? No, my concern is that Congress was always divided, and that the pacifist part of the Working Committee would have always found it extremely difficult to enter into any agreement to collaborate with Britain in the military defense of India. Consider how much was being asked of Congress. Here is a nationalist party, trained during years of struggle to regard Britain as the enemy and non-violent non-cooperation as the weapon. Suddenly they are asked not merely to abandon the struggle against Britain but actually to share in the responsibility for the conduct of a bloody war with the British government as an ally. A few like Rajagopalachari had no doubts and were prepared to accept the necessity of cooperation with Britain against the common enemy; Nehru, closest of Gandhi's followers, had long decided that in this situation he was first an anti-fascist. But not all Gandhi's followers had made any such decision, and though Gandhi was not himself present at the negotiations, his influence was powerful. Sir Stafford Cripps has spoken of a last-minute intervention by Gandhi, while equally truthful men, like Rajagopalachari and Nehru, have denied it. There is no difficulty in finding an explanation for this apparent contradiction. Sir Stafford may well have known of telephone conversations between Gandhi and some of his followers about which Rajagopalachari and Nehru knew nothing. But we move from the sphere of deduction into that of certainty when we state that Congress was deeply divided and hesitant; that it feared finding itself trapped into decisions that it might regret; that it very naturally found the Cripps proposals lacking in that dramatic concession of power that would have enabled it to go to its

constituents confident of persuading them to abandon the tradition of non-violent non-cooperation and to rally to the new flag of violent cooperation. Remember, too, that Congress was skeptical, after the Burma campaign, of Britain's capacity to defend India against Japan.

Is it any wonder that a committee, so torn as this, should prefer the unity of refusal on a main constitutional issue chosen by themselves to the hazards of an acceptance which might divide its ranks and which to some of its members would certainly be psychologically more difficult than another period in a mild and already deplorably familiar confinement?

My own summary would therefore be that if Congress had been a more united and resolute body, less dogged by a minority attitude and a tradition of negotiations, it might have accepted the Cripps proposals and made of them, as Cripps suggested, the first and crucial stage in the formation of a real National Government. I add that the British might, in my judgment, have made an offer that even this divided committee could have found no excuse for rejecting. The failure was on both sides.

All this is past, but still important. I well understand the immense attraction of Gandhi and how Louis Fischer has become his apologist. The Mahatma's technique of non-violent non-cooperation is one of the great inventions of history, and stubbornly adhered to, it might have driven the British from India years ago. But it is a purely negative method, and it is not capable of dilution or compromise. Gandhi cares, says Fischer, about India's national independence first, and he was prepared to drop his pacifism for it. Certain it is that through months of negotiations Gandhi did in fact move to a position in which he accepted, in words at least, majority decisions that involved the total repudiation of pacifism. At the final meeting of Congress before the arrest of the leaders a resolution was passed offering certain military collaboration if a National Government was formed. It is a pity this resolution did not come earlier and that, when it did, it was accompanied by the threat of civil disobedience. Earlier resolutions attempted to bridge the gap between militarism and pacifism by the use of such ambiguous words as "resistance," which could mean violence to one Congress member and non-violence to



"HAVE EITHER OF THE PATIENTS REGAINED CONSCIOUSNESS?"

another. Moreover, Gandhi's whole record, as any study of his pronouncements during this war shows, is not only that of a pacifist but that of a politician who sees his duty to go to any lengths in the attempt to keep India out of war. Under his leadership India would pass into Japanese hands not because he was or could be pro-Japanese but because that would be the result of his policy. No doubt Gandhi hoped, if the British did quit India, to persuade Japan not to invade, and if this persuasion failed, to offer non-violent non-cooperative resistance. This technique, sometimes successful in appealing to the public conscience of a Western democracy, would certainly be ineffective against the Japanese army.

There is a further point that American critics neglect. They ask why we do not "quit India." I am not denying that there is an imperialist reluctance to relinquish power. But note that at this moment nothing would in fact so much alarm Americans and adherents of the United Nations everywhere, including India, as for us to attempt anything of the sort. No Indian party asks us to quit India until after the war, when we have promised to do so.

Indians distrust British post-war promises? True, and other members of the United Nations may perform a service, in my view, by offering to give a joint guaranty of this freedom. Americans who take part in this controversy should ask themselves whether they are prepared for the responsibilities involved in such a guaranty, which should be a joint affair of the United Nations, necessarily involving a new attitude on the part of both America and Britain toward all Asiatic and colored peoples. Indians, it should be noticed, are becoming suspicious of American as well as of British imperialism, and the participation of Russia, and especially of China, which is intimately concerned with the defense of India, seems essential if any such scheme is to succeed.

In regard to the immediate situation, I do not know whether it is now too late to form a genuine National Government in India to collaborate with the British in defense against Japan. I should myself like to see another attempt made by men like Rajagopalachari and Sir Tej Sapur to set about the task, without any restrictions, of establishing a National Government, with the fullest facilities for negotiation with any leaders, in or out of jail, who are ready to collaborate in India's defense. I cannot now judge how likely success would be: I am sure some such offer should be made; and if, as is possible, success would be more likely with a United Nations guaranty, then I should choose that method. There may be other means of ending civil disobedience and the reign of violence, of approaching a reconciliation and the formation in India of a genuine National Government. No possibility should be neglected. I welcome American interest and help in any such settlement. I only suggest that the starting-point must not be a desire to expose British imperialism—a game in which I have

myself taken a hand—but a responsible realization that we are in a desperate war which includes India. Every critic who writes about India should ask himself coolly and earnestly what exactly in these circumstances he is advocating. To give the American public the idea that there is some simple action of quitting India which Britain should take, leaving Mr. Gandhi in charge in India, is to serve the interests of no one except the Nazis and the Japanese. The problem is not now one of quitting India but of finding how, in defending India, to pass over the largest possible measure of power to the most responsible and representative Indians.

In the Wind

PAUL PALMER, who was editor of the *American Mercury* when it published articles favorable to fascism and featured such writers as Lawrence Dennis and Harold Lord Varney, has been made a Senior Editor of *Reader's Digest*.

NEGRO OFFICERS are now being commissioned at the rate of about 275 a month.

WENDELL WILLKIE last week submitted to the President a long report on his trip around the world. No one else was present at the meeting. Willkie talked and answered questions, and the President acted as his own stenographer.

JACK GOODMAN, a parodist and author of "How to Do Practically Anything," learned that his friend Rex Stout had been asked by the *New York Times* to review Herbert Agar's "A Time for Greatness." To amuse himself Goodman wrote a review of the book the way he thought Stout would write it. He sent it to Stout, who liked it so much that he passed it along to the *Times*, which published it.

AN ARTICLE in the London *Sunday Express* which urged the abandonment of discrimination against Negroes was released by the censors for circulation in the British colonies but forbidden to be sent to this country.

MIKE GOLD in the *Daily Worker*: "I would be glad to join a league that helped . . . tobacco fiends to forget their dope and to substitute Communist work or other forms of idealism for smoking."

A JOSEPH LEWIS of Purdys, New York, has written to several magazine and newspaper editors advancing the thesis that the Thanksgiving celebration is responsible for many of our difficulties and urging that it be discontinued. "Shortly after the President issued his proclamation last year," Mr. Lewis writes, "within a month to be exact, the Japanese stabbed us in the back at Pearl Harbor while talking peace to our face in the White House."

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item.]

BOOKS and the ARTS

M., W., F. AT 10

BY LIONEL TRILLING

PROBABLY few *Nation* readers will have heard of the book I am writing about. It has never been advertised in the literary sections; it may never have been reviewed. It is "A Survey-History of English Literature" by William Bradley Otis and Morriss H. Needleman. Its aim is modest: it undertakes to present all the useful facts and necessary opinions about English literature. Barnes and Noble first issued it as one of a series of review-outlines but it seems to have had an unusual success and it is now being advertised and adopted as a required textbook for college courses. This utilitarian, rather grubby-looking volume is, I think, one of the symptoms of our intellectual condition.

My own interest in it is first of all aesthetic. For me there is a pawky charm in its mysterious critical statements. I like to read of Thomas Carew:

Gentlemen of the privy chamber (1628). Taster-in-ordinary to the King (1630). Friend of Suckling. Brilliant wit, lover of women and rime. Skilfully polished verse, neat and tuneful phrase, mastery of the overlapped heroic couplet. Second only to Herrick, lacking the latter's warmth and love of nature, but possessing a sensuous fancy and a becoming virility. . . . Best of his longer poems is "A Rapture," audaciously amatory and "marred" by unrefined passionate "impurity," emphasizing the physical (and to some the "perverted") side of love much in the way of Aretino and Donne. In the latter poem his expressions, metaphorical either through volition or constraint, are not inappropriately imaginative; e.g. "And we will coyne young Cupids," and taste "The warme firme Apple, tipt with corall berry." Two of his most common stanzaic structures are *ababcc* and *ababbb*.

Of this it is perhaps appropriate to remark, in the cryptic words the authors use of John Webster's work, that its "pornography is endemic rather than deliberate."

Then it is fascinating to read that Bacon's "counsels for the practical life are nucleated by three staple subjects" and to wonder why the authors wrote this rather than "stapled by three nuclear subjects." And there are those mad masterpieces of cautiousness from which we learn of Gibbon that "not only may his anti-Christian arguments be antiquated but his method of historical research may be defective or obsolete," and that his history is "somewhat sneering in its ironical deference toward Christianity." But most engaging of all is the system of parallel opinions, the columns of Suggested Merits balanced by the columns of Suggested Defects. Of "Beowulf" a Suggested Merit is "Broad study of character"; a Suggested Defect is "No minute characterization." Two Suggested Merits of Dr. Johnson are "Teacher of moral wisdom" and "Sonorous words," but a glance to the right discovers that two Suggested Defects are "A moralist in everything he wrote" and "Copious use of Latinized vocabulary." With an apparatus like this it is impossible to go wrong.

For example, under Alexander Pope we find:

Suggested Merits

2. Heatless, faultless lucidity. Polished and brilliant diction. Unerring choice of right word, incisive.

Suggested Defects

2. Poor in largeness of imagination. Rhetoric, not poetry. Periphrastic constructions and pretentious expressions.

In every class of English B1 (M., W., F. at 10) some students will take their stand as Merit men or Defect men, but they will be strong-minded rather than well-rounded. Well-rounded students with a proper feeling for the nuances of criticism will know how to deal with the problem of Pope's style: "Pope, by his polished and brilliant diction, his periphrastic constructions and pretentious expressions, achieved a heatless, faultless lucidity. As a result of his unerring choice of the right word he produced rhetoric, not poetry."

But literature is not always easy and even the well-rounded student will be stumped by the Wordsworth situation. For no sooner has he absorbed Suggested Merit 1, "Spiritual love of nature, cosmic sympathy for peaceful things," than he has to square it with Suggested Defect 1, "In a strict sense is not always a descriptive poet, nor a great nature poet." The chances are that he will prefer Suggested Merit 2, "Found God in Nature—pantheistic philosophy," to Defect 2, "Philosophy unorthodox, or materialistic, or pantheistic, or mystical"; with Defects so irreconcilable any sensible student will hang on to Merits. But then he will have to deal with Merit 5, "Love poetry while small in quantity, is important for its personal quality, intensity and significance," as against Defect 5, "Lack of intensity and passion; note the mention but not the expression of sexual passion."

Mr. Otis and Mr. Needleman lack taste and prose, but they have not been lazy—they have accumulated the facts, they have consulted the treatises and learned journals and they cite their sources assiduously and indiscriminately, so that even graduate students use the "Survey-History" as a cram-book, finding it more efficient than the older discursive histories. Perhaps a moderately intelligent graduate student could make use of the facts and laugh at the opinions—although not all the facts are correct (we are told that Swift in *A Modest Proposal* "proposes revoltingly that the Irish should fatten and eat their children for food") and although, in the study of literature, it is often hard to separate fact and opinion. But not all graduate students are moderately intelligent and the "Survey-History" is primarily intended not for graduate students but for undergraduate "majors" in English and for those students who are taking a "required" or an "elective" course in literature, perhaps the only one they will ever have. A concise manual of facts is useful, even a cram-book can be recommended if its purpose is properly understood, but the "Survey-History," as I have said, is making its way in some of our colleges as a textbook, a historical and critical account of literature, an approved source of attitudes and ideas. When we have this in mind, the "Survey-History" begins to seem less funny than it is.

Of the graduate students and the "majors" in English, a large number become teachers; and it is not at all funny to think of teachers instructing young people in literature out of the opinions and in the style of the "Survey-History."

It is not essential to anybody's education to know anything at all about Chapman's "Caesar and Pompey," but when the student reads of this play, "Ethical reflection. Cato, the protagonist, commits suicide," he has been led to suppose that this nugget of inconsequence is a literary fact or idea. When he has been taught that "not the pitter-patter of hearts is involved" in the novels of Scott, "who apparently has no major purpose of crying in the wilderness" and "is quite blind to the abstract intelligence"; or that Sir Thomas Browne wrote "tasseled" prose; or that "The Tempest" is "poetically emotional" although "its character-outlines [have] no particular merit"; or that Milton's "Epitaphium Damonis" is superior to "Lycidas" "in sincerity and purpose"; or that Blake has "intense, ecstatic sensitiveness to impressions" but is "unable to depict his sensibilities," he—who is to be a member of the literary public, possibly a teacher—has had thrust upon him every shabby, fusty, third-rate vulgarity of opinion—I have chosen at random—that has ever attached itself to a work of English literature. Education for democracy? Perhaps we ought to begin with education for democracy's first element, simple intellectual decency.

And perhaps that is the element students are looking for when they turn away from literature to science or even social science. The honest student who takes his one course in literature with the help of the "Survey-History" or with a teacher who can use the "Survey-History" will surely be impatient to get it over with and go on to a less cynical subject. Even the literary student, the "major" in English, will surely need to be fortified by a native sense of intellectual honor if he is not to suppose that the study of literature is the jolliest of the disciplines because in literature anything goes.

In academic circles we hear a great deal about the sad estate into which literary studies have fallen and a great deal about what the function of the teacher of literature should be. Well, let us consider that the authors of the "Survey-History" made their book in an apparently successful effort to meet what is presumably an academic need; let us consider too that they made their book, as their footnotes testify, out of the precious essence of academic literary opinion. They have accumulated all the academic ideas, taking the good with the bad, distilling both into silliness, making a negation of common-sense and meaning. I am not trying to absolve the "Survey-History" nor to indict a profession; but clearly the "Survey-History" could not have been written without the connivance of a large number of teachers of English. And what is important is not that a foolish and vulgar book has been produced but that the written word is being treated without seriousness and respect by the very people who are supposed to be its guardians.

So the "Survey-History" is not a funny book after all. It raises grave thoughts. At the moment, however, I can escape the serious reflections by contemplating Defoe's lack of modern conveniences: I have just discovered in the "Survey-History" that one of Defoe's Suggested Defects is "No plumbing of the soul."

LITERATURE FOR CHILDREN

BY BETSY HUTCHISON

DURING all the centuries that children were seen but not heard they managed to see and hear a great deal. Growing up was the process of trying to figure out adult behavior, at first toward yourself and then in the adult world in general. Adults themselves did little to enlighten you.

For the last two decades adults have been studying the workings of the child's mind, considering how to make the world plausible to him and which parts of it should be made plausible at each stage. The results in pedagogical reform are a little disappointing, but that may be because progressive education, like Christianity, has been tried so seldom and by so few, and those few have sometimes been fanatics. The results in children's literature are so bountiful that we really do need a week out of the year to give thanks for the harvest, and to select a few of its fruits for those who give Children's Book Week a more than academic interest for us.

The informative books of the new era in children's literature are perhaps its most striking contribution. Even more than the so-called popularizations for adult consumption they have achieved a high level of integrity, which is often coupled with literary quality. Above all, most of them show a real respect for their audience; they do not condescend. There are of course some juvenile authors who are painfully aware that they are bridging a gap between themselves and their readers, and who assume that the adult must make the whole effort to reach the child. These authors write down; they produce a nauseating species of literary baby-talk, and their books are bought by adults who like to think of children in baby-talk terms. Beware of archness in children's books, especially when they are beautifully illustrated! I could name names, but I forbear.

On the other hand, there are the authors who recognize the child's impulse toward exploration and discovery and aim to meet him halfway because they know that he wants to go part of the way himself. If they are writing books which inform or explain they do not dress up the subject matter with irrelevant frills or tuck away pills of knowledge in the jelly of romance. They themselves find the subject matter romantic, and their enthusiasm is contagious. (Indeed, contagion is nine-tenths of good pedagogy.) Among these are the Petershams, Henry Lent, Roger du Voisin, the d'Aulaires, Gertrude Hartmann, Donald Culross Peattie, and the father of them all, Hendrick Willem van Loon. If the books are intended for children of ten and upward, an adult can test them by his own enjoyment. I cannot believe that Carleton Washburne's "Secrets of the Earth and Sky" should be limited to children's consumption, and it would be a dull adult who could not enjoy and profit by a reading of Genevieve Foster's "George Washington's World," a triumph of the art of book-making as well as a pattern of imaginative historical writing.

Juvenile fiction has its source in quite another wellspring, probably deeper in the unconscious mind of the writer. But the best authors in this field do not seem to be dealing with the problems offered by their special audience so much as with those which concern all creative writers. If they succeed,

In a dark age of terror, when brutal empires crushed out the liberties of small nations, and when arrogant wealth bestrode the common people of every land, the Bible and its religion came into the world as a challenge to tyranny and reaction.

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the effect is spontaneous, and the result a communication of emotion. They can abandon themselves unashamed to comedy, as does Atwater in his "Mr. Popper's Penguins"; they can present tragedy undisguised as does Kate Seredy in "The Singing Tree," a story so poignantly beautiful in its plea for peace that one hesitates to offer it to children who have to face what lies between us and the achievement of peace. They can identify themselves with a historical background, without a trace of educational uplift, as does Cornelia Meigs or Lois Lenski; or they can lose themselves in fantasy like Disney or again Meigs in "The Wonderful Locomotive." They can present a great personality in the light of its human value—with no hint of "lives of great men all remind us"—as does Babette Deutsch in her "Walt Whitman," or Lisitzky in his "Thomas Jefferson." There is a long list by now of those who do one or more of these things, from Mark Twain, Louisa Alcott, Lewis Carroll, and Kipling to Disney, Ransome, Flack, Dagleish, Kästner, Laura Ingalls Wilder, the Farjeons, Seredy, and Eric Knight, who should be included in a juvenile list for that great dog story "Lassie Come-Home."

But here the naming of names is a hopeless task, and an unnecessary one. The third edition of "The Right Book for the Right Child," completely revised and reset (The John Day Company, \$3), contains thirteen hundred titles selected and annotated by a committee of children's librarians, and graded by the experts of Winnetka, than whom none are more expert where the working of the child's mind is concerned. The annotations are informative; the selection is comprehensive, including a judicious sprinkling of classics for almost all ages and a few adult titles for older children, especially from the field of biography. In spite of the most painstaking search, I can find very few omissions. These include the Farjeons' two delightful volumes of historical nonsense in verse, "Kings and Queens" and "Heroes and Heroines," and Donald Culross Peattie's "Child's History of the World." The titles are all graded according to the reading ability required, a fact too often overlooked by the well-meaning Santa. Unfortunately they are also arranged according to reading ability, which will probably discourage the average parent or adopted uncle. But this edition, like its predecessors, will be very helpful to teachers and librarians. The layman's standby will continue to be Josette Frank's "What Books for Children?" (Doubleday, Doran. Revised, 1941. Published under the auspices of the Child Study Association).

There is one great satisfaction about using lists of children's books. Although they may cover twenty years of publishing, the majority of the titles are still in print. For every year brings a new generation of six-year-olds who know not "Humphrey" or "Diggers and Builders" and of eleven-year-olds ripe for "Blueberry Mountain" or "Invincible Louisa" or "The Prince and the Pauper." Classics are made in ten years or less when a year or two represents a generation, and such classics are alive. The present season brings a shipload of new treasures to set beside the old ones, but by no means to supplant them. Leave ennui to the grown-ups!

[A selected list, compiled by Lena Barksdale, of children's books published this season appeared in The Nation of November 14.]

Memoirs of Julian Green

MEMORIES OF HAPPY DAYS. By Julian Green. Harper and Brothers. \$3.

IF THERE is any truth in Dante's famous statement that no suffering is greater than remembering past happiness in present unhappiness, most of the inhabitants of the world have cause to suffer today. But for those Europeans, and particularly the French, who have taken refuge in the pleasant purgatory of America, all hope is not lost: they know that eventually heaven will be granted them in the form of a return to their native land. This is probably what permits them to mull over the past with such evident pleasure.

A few weeks ago André Maurois gave us his urbane memoirs; now an equally significant, though younger, French writer recounts his childhood and youth. Julian Green is a literary anomaly. An American of solid Georgian and Virginian ancestry, he was born and educated in Paris, where he grew up to distinguish himself as one of the most original French novelists of his generation. As a young child he sat on his mother's lap and listened without understanding a word while she read in English to "the little French monkey," as she affectionately called him. And now, after a dozen successful novels, most of which have been translated into English, he has come to America for the first prolonged stay since the three years he spent at the University of Virginia (1919-22), written his first book in his mother's tongue, and joined the United States army.

It is rare that a writer can express himself so personally in two languages. Oh, to be sure, his mother's tongue shows occasional signs of being influenced by his mother tongue: he "assists at" ceremonies, "profits by" opportunities, "is persuaded" of facts, "agitates" questions, and piles "heteroclitous" luggage into a taxi—but these are the only such examples in the whole book. It is more interesting that Julian Green, whose novels are so singularly lacking in humor, shows here a delightful and typically American sense of humor, as for instance in the passage describing the scene when his cousin Sarah, a loyal Southerner without the grim earnestness of the older generation, played "Marching Through Georgia" in the Greens' Paris flat: "A brief altercation followed and tears were shed; and that was the last time Sherman's boys marched through our house." No such sketch as the following will be found in his novels either: "Next to the baroness sat a middle-aged Mexican lady whose green sweater was outrageously and purposely tight, but whose tongue, by way of compensation, was loose; a heavy brown fringe fell over her eyes; she smoked cigarettes and talked about men in a manner which made the baroness wince."

The greater part of Julian Green's memoirs concerns his childhood in Paris and André on the Seine, the only boy in a family of six children. It tells of the beauty of France, the rigors of a French education, the supernatural fears of a sensitive child, the gathering war clouds in those calm days before 1914. This is only just, since Julian Green told us in his diary, published here three years ago: "All that I write is immediately and directly derived from my childhood." The later pages, after the experiences as an ambulance driver at

"I do not remember any literary history recently to appear that is more judicious or more sensitive."

—HOWARD MUMFORD JONES
Saturday Review

ON NATIVE GROUNDS *Alfred Kazin*

"Kazin is a critic who brings to his survey of American literature of the modern period something of the high seriousness of Matthew Arnold . . . I do not think I exaggerate when I say this book is the signal of a new force in American criticism."—Irwin Edman, *N. Y. Herald Tribune "Books."*

"An admirable book . . . his scholarship is notable . . . his taste is mature and discriminating. Quite the best and most complete treatment we have."—Lionel Trilling, *The Nation*.

"Fresh, sane, original, unintimidated by fashionable shibboleths or the intellectual arrogances of older and less reasonable men. Mr. Kazin cuts his own path through the literary woods and doesn't care in the least where the chips fall."—Orville Prescott, *N. Y. Times*.

"Here is a book worth cheering for. I find myself going back again and again to savor the bright lines. He describes writing with an excitement that he communicates to his willing reader."—Harry Hansen, *N. Y. World-Telegram*.

"I know of no literary history of the last half-century which moves so rapidly, is so full of original insights. Here, at last, is literary criticism that is something more than academic muttering. Here is a fresh voice."—Lewis Gannett, *N. Y. Herald Tribune*. \$3.75

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the front and as a student at Charlottesville, describe the writer's early struggles. They contain suggestive discussions of the relative value of plot and characters, of the difficulties of the writer's medium, and revealing portraits of friends such as Jean Cocteau, André Gide, Robert de Saint Jean.

To say this is to suggest the limitations of these memoirs. Despite their nostalgic charm, they are too unaffectedly intimate to mean much to the general reader. But to the student of modern French literature, and particularly of Julian Green's admirable novels, they form an invaluable adjunct to his "Personal Record, 1928-1939."

JUSTIN O'BRIEN

Journalists on Leave

NEWSMEN'S HOLIDAY: NIEMAN ESSAYS—FIRST SERIES. Harvard University Press. \$2.

ONE of the most interesting experiments in the American newspaper field since the turn of the century undoubtedly has been the establishment of the Nieman fellowships at Harvard University. The men who receive these annual grants, entitling them to browse at will for nine months at America's greatest center of learning, attending lectures or not, as they prefer, but enjoying the stimulus which comes from residence in such an atmosphere, have a rare opportunity. The maturity and intellectual curiosity of these picked reporters, desk men, and editorial writers and the cordiality with which they have been received at Cambridge have made the Nieman experiment highly successful.

In the volume under review the fourth group of Nieman fellows, those who terminated their residence last June, have combined to make a book of eleven essays about the newspaper business, essays which were originally conceived without thought of publication. But now that they have been put between covers they enable the public to get a clearer picture of this group of Nieman fellows than it has had of their predecessors.

These eleven essays cover various aspects of journalism. There are reminiscences here, together with discussions of such subjects as editorial independence, press agents, the Newspaper Guild, censorship, sports pages, the weekly newspaper, and related matters. Evident throughout are an earnestness and a striving after truth utterly alien to the whiskey-soaked caricatures conjured up in Hollywood who pass for newspapermen with a regrettably large section of the moviegoing public. Nor is there anything surprising in this. Anybody who has been the "guinea pig" at one of the fortnightly Nieman dinners knows that these boys are alert, keen-minded, intellectually curious, and as tenacious in pursuit of a fact as a hound dog on the trail of a fugitive possum.

After the introduction by Curator Louis Lyons, the book opens with an authentic bit of reminiscence by Kenneth Stewart, who carries us from the copy desk of the New York Telegram to the Paris Herald, and then back to Gotham to the bedside of the dying World. The success with which Mr. Stewart recreates the atmosphere of the various newspaper shops on both sides of the Atlantic in which he has worked makes this chapter a stand-out. Another high point is the final chapter, in which Thomas Sancton provides a

sharply etched vignette of a fictitious character named "Charlie Wilson," the prototype of the newspaper "failure."

In between there is a chapter by Henning Heldt on the origins and *raison d'être* of the Newspaper Guild, which states the case for that organization with reasonable clarity and detachment. Mr. Heldt is properly enthusiastic over the substantial pay increases which the Guild has managed to obtain for its members at a time when those increases were sorely needed. Now that the organization has divested itself of its extreme left-wing leadership, more cordial relations between guildsmen and management should be possible. The tone of the *Guild Reporter* at one period was such as to make these relations almost out of the question.

Mr. Heldt's severe strictures upon the ethics of many publishers are partially answered by Robert Lasch, who presents in a well-balanced chapter a number of the arguments on the other side.

There is a meaty discussion of the weekly newspaper by Neil Davis. It sets forth with cogency the problems which beset the small-town editor. Some of us who rumble daily in the editorial pages may be taken aback by Mr. Davis's dictum that the weekly editor "swings far more influence in his home community than any other editor." Which is to say that when we editors of dailies think we are stirring up the animals and fluttering the doves from one end of the state to the other with blasts from our sanctums, we probably are not sufficiently aware of the extent to which the weeklies can checkmate us. Some weeklies, of course, carry no editorials, and others confine themselves to such soporific themes as "Patronize Your Local Merchant" and "Go to Church Regularly," but Mr. Davis is talking about those with a vigorous editorial approach. Their potency in their respective bailiwicks is doubtless greater than we city slickers care to admit.

All in all, "Newsmen's Holiday" is a readable volume. Most of the Nieman fellows represented here are worth listening to. In publishing their views concerning the profession which claims them, they have established a precedent which, it is to be hoped, will be followed by other fellows of the foundation.

VIRGINIUS DABNEY

Lincoln and the Copperheads

THE HIDDEN CIVIL WAR: THE STORY OF THE COPPERHEADS. By Wood Gray. The Viking Press. \$3.75.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE FIFTH COLUMN. By George Fort Milton. The Vanguard Press. \$3.50.

IN SEEKING to assemble the facts of the Copperhead movement during the Civil War the historian labors under certain disadvantages. In great part the correspondence of the Midwestern Democratic leaders has disappeared—it has apparently been intentionally destroyed. The evidence of sensational reports of spies and detectives is highly suspect. Moreover, although many records of the War Department have now been deposited in the National Archives, those of the United States Secret Service are still closed to students.

Nevertheless, in the preparation of "The Hidden Civil

November 21, 1942

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War" Professor Gray has examined an enormous body of material, both in print and manuscript. He has carefully searched the files of Midwestern newspapers of the period and discovered relevant editorial opinion, as well as instructive reports of clashes and riots. His study is concerned with the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, where the strength of the Copperhead movement was concentrated. It clearly analyzes the relation of the subversive element to the Democratic Party as a whole—a relation which was to redound to the disadvantage of that party, lessening for many years its strength as an opposition.

Professor Gray's foreword acknowledges a debt to his birthplace, Petersburg—formerly New Salem—Illinois, where he listened to the reminiscences of surviving "boys in blue" and Copperheads from "Secesh Lane." Little of the color of those reminiscences has penetrated his book. It is a carefully and factual account of a critical phase of our history.

While Professor Gray's study leaves the impression that the decline of the Copperhead organizations was largely the result of the military successes of the Union, George Fort Milton believes that the failure was primarily due to "the lack of leadership, futile disorganization, and ineffectiveness of plan" of the revolutionary leaders. "Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth Column" abounds in incident and personality. Mr. Milton sketches the arch-Copperheads, Vallandigham and Fernando Wood; Horatio Seymour, the patriotic Democrat who was Governor of New York, and Oliver P. T. Morton, the Republican Governor of Indiana, who made himself the virtual dictator of his state. While recognizing the fallibility of "spy" evidence, the author frequently makes use of it, both in his account of the conspirators and of the federal agents who worked to uncover their plots. In spite of Mr. Milton's easy manner of writing and evident enjoyment of the subject, he has produced a book which leaves the impression of being rambling and discursive. It lacks the solidity of, for example, "The Age of Hate," the author's study of Andrew Johnson and the Radicals.

To the mind of this reviewer, the use of the term "Fifth Column" in connection with the American 1860's is as disconcerting as it would be to speak of the Copperheads of the Spanish Civil War.

MARGARET LEECH

Spotlight on Canada

CANADA, TODAY AND TOMORROW. By William Henry Chamberlin. An Atlantic Monthly Press Book. Little, Brown and Company. \$3.

THE UNGUARDED FRONTIER: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN-CANADIAN RELATIONS. By Edgar W. McInnis. Doubleday, Doran and Company. \$3.

CANADA'S drastic system of economic controls and anti-inflation measures has brought it more and more into the American spotlight in the past few months. Even foreign correspondents, who have up to now neglected the mine of good copy, have begun to sit up and take notice. The first to produce a book on Canada is William Henry Chamberlin, and he has set a high standard for those who follow. "Canada Today and Tomorrow" is a first-rate job of



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fact gathering and analysis. For Americans who want to understand what goes on north of their 3,800 miles of undefended border it is required reading. They will understand the situation even better if they read Professor McInnis's excellent history of that border in conjunction with Chamberlin's book.

Canada is no subject for hit-and-run journalists, for it is a country of infinite and deep-seated complexities. It is a country with a stomach full of seventeenth-century France, in the form of the province of Quebec, which it cannot digest and cannot get rid of. It is rent by sectional animosities and antagonistic economic interests. The three most powerful disturbers—religious conflict, economic conflict, and geographic conflict—produce almost hopeless division. And yet such a substantial degree of unity has been forged that Canada's war effort has been prodigious. Chamberlin has seen all these things clearly, and in the main he gets them into proper perspective. Few Canadians know that the planes of their vast air-training scheme fly a million miles a day, but Chamberlin dug out the fact. This year the country will produce enough aluminum for 80,000 planes. It has the largest small-arms plant in the world and the largest shell factory in the British Empire, and it has reached parity with Britain itself in the construction of merchant shipping. For a nation which had to start almost from scratch, these are

accomplishments of the first magnitude. To pay for these things Canada has taxed its people to a point where the rates are only slightly below those of Britain.

The Canadian picture is not without its dark side. Canadian labor has been passed over in the appointments to government control boards. It does not feel happy about the anti-inflation controls. It clamors for production councils which the government has been slow to set up. It has no Wagner Act, and it wants one badly. However, despite its grievances Canadian labor is solidly behind the war, though internally it is a house divided. The war between industrial and craft unionism almost wrecked the Canadian labor movement twenty-three years ago. It has never recovered from this struggle. Today only one Canadian in fifteen belongs to a union.

As the war goes on, the Canadian economy is becoming more and more enmeshed with that of the United States. Indeed, some critics complain that Ottawa has become nothing but a branch office for Washington, that nothing can be done here without Washington's approval. This is an exaggeration which has some basis in fact, but not much. Canada depends largely upon the United States for certain vital supplies—for a great deal of steel, for airplane engines, for oil and for coal. The Hyde Park agreement has enabled it so far to obtain these things. But Canada's war production is so large that it can hardly continue to produce enough other things to pay for its supplies, and it may soon have to borrow or come under lease-lend.

Chamberlin believes that after the war Canada and the United States will move much closer together. Here I think he is on solid ground. If a large measure of world free trade does not come out of the peace, that will be the only solution for Canada's economic problems. But any approach to reciprocity will be bitterly fought by the industrial provinces of Ontario and Quebec. Into these provinces American industrialists have poured almost \$4 billion in investments in branch factories. They will seek to protect this investment by maintenance of a high Canadian tariff to shut out American competition. This is one phase of Canada's problem which Chamberlin does not see quite clearly. To live, Canada must trade. It produces enough food, for example, to feed four or five times its population. Obviously it cannot dispose of its wheat if imports are kept out.

In his history of the unguarded frontier so dear to the after-dinner speakers, Professor McInnis unearths many interesting and long-forgotten facts. That Canada managed to preserve its independence from the United States can largely be attributed to two facts. The first is the fantastic incompetence of the military efforts made to conquer it. Secondly, the imperialistic tendencies of the United States were directed toward the south and west at the time when it might have been able to swallow Canada. The border has not always been peaceful. Despite the fact that 40,000 Canadians fought with the Union armies during the Civil War, there was much bad feeling on both sides of the line at that time. Southerners plotted in Canada and Fenian raiders tried to free Ireland by invading Canada. For years America's trouble with Britain bedeviled its relations with Canada. Since Canada became a nation in its own right, relations have progressively improved.

JAMES H. GRAY

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DRAMA

A Vehicle for Miss Hepburn

AS ALL playgoers know, Philip Barry has his serious side. For many years he has tended to alternate between light comedy and more pretentious pieces tinged with religious mysticism. When, therefore, one sees the title "Without Love," that title not unnaturally suggests Roman Catholic theology—at least to those who are aware of the fact that "love" is not the exclusive possession of Hollywood and the pulp magazines. I, for one, found myself thinking in advance of O'Neill's "Days Without End" and anticipating some indictment of modern man on the charge of being—as he too often seems—"loveless" in the full theological and philosophical senses of that word. Imagine, then, my surprise to discover in the play which the Guild is presenting at the St. James Theater little more than a vehicle for Katharine Hepburn and her assisting co-star, Elliott Nugent—a vehicle in which "love" seems to be used almost exclusively in the *True Confessions* sense and the two people without it seem to be merely young members of opposite sexes who are slow to recognize a normal inclination toward the consummation of their marriage. "Without Love" is, in other words, little more than one more retelling of the old, old story of the marriage of convenience which everyone expects the parties most directly concerned recognizes from the beginning as something more than that. This has always been, on its own level, a good story, and it still is. For one thing, it provides an opportunity for intimate dalliance which would be almost censorably embarrassing if the two parties were not already licensed to proceed even farther than they actually do. For another, audiences always find it pleasantly exasperating to watch a member of the male sex regarding his manifest opportunities. But there is some significance in the fact that when the story is acted out—as it often is—at neighborhood movies on a Saturday afternoon, the hero always gets audible encouragement from the small boys assembled.

Considered simply as a "vehicle," "Without Love" serves its purpose well enough. Mr. Nugent plays the hero, who is assumed to be a young economist of remarkable abilities, as an engaging mixture of shyness and determination. Miss Hepburn, as the no

longer idle daughter of the idle rich, brings to the role her gift for making a certain gauche angularity seem authentically elegant. Largely for these reasons the piece will almost certainly play the season out and run on the road as long as Miss Hepburn will consent to let it. Nor do I wish to deny Mr. Barry the credit that is due him. Even if, here as so often, he slightly overdoes an effect which he knows so well how to create and introduces us to people almost too charming, elegant, witty, sophisticated, and well bred, the fact remains that he does really know how to create that effect. Moreover, his dialogue has point and style as well as an extraordinary air of accomplished ease. Not more than one or two other contemporary playwrights can equal or even approach him when it comes to turning out an epigram—as distinguished from the epigram's roughneck twin, the wisecrack—pointed enough to be delightful without being too elaborate to sound convincing as conversation. And though there is no very large number of such epigrams in "Without Love," there are several. An example might be Miss Hepburn's remark while attempting to explain the effect of a New England back-

ground on her love life, "I pray for guidance—and blush when I get it." Another, which sounded quite as good but hardly stands so well the test of cold type, is her husband's diagnosis of the same dilemma, "Like the Tower of Pisa you may have certain leanings—but you remain upright."

For all these and for certain other reasons "Without Love" will not only run the season out but deserve to do so, provided of course one does not assume that success of that sort is any more than precisely success of that sort. Nevertheless, I cannot help coming back to the feeling that there is something objectionable in the play as a whole and that it ought to be either less serious or more so.

I have not, thus far, mentioned the fact that the background is Washington just before our entry into the war and that into the main action there keep intruding political references, quite a little hocus-pocus about big men with secrets for the President's ear, and some childishly simple theses about the Irish problem. What, I kept asking myself, is all this doing in a bedroom story? And no possible answer seemed even moderately satisfactory. If the war and its

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problems are what really interest the author most, then his main plot is singularly ill chosen. If the intention was somehow to establish a real connection and through that connection to give to the title some such inclusive significance as I suggested at the beginning, then I can only say that I fail absolutely to see what the connection is or how the story of Miss Hepburn as wife-in-name-only makes any point more important than the obvious one. Finally if, as I suspect, these patriotic or political references are merely an attempt to give some timeliness and weight to an essentially frivolous piece, then the device seems to me quite unworthy of Mr. Barry. I am not among those who proclaim that this is no time for comedy. I see no objection to plays, even frivolous plays, which have nothing to do with the war and which deliberately refrain from acknowledging its existence. But I do object to those which introduce the subject superficially or trivially; and it seems to me that, for all its occasional pretense of seriousness, "Without Love" does exactly that. To use our peril and our resolution, to use France and Poland, Dunkirk and the A. E. F., merely as a timely device for getting two young people to bed seems to me, to state it mildly, verging on bad taste. It is too uncomfortably like advertising lipstick for morale or inventing the slogan "V for Victory—and for Mt. Vernon Whiskey."

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

MUSIC

FOR the first time in my own lifetime, and probably in the lifetimes of most others, there is a performance of Berlioz's "Roméo and Juliet" in its entirety—and not just any performance but one conducted by Toscanini that gives the work a form, a life in sound such as we are not likely to hear again. The mechanical means exist by which millions of persons throughout the country can hear the performance at least this once; but it is not broadcast because N. B. C. has bought exclusive rights to Toscanini's name for broadcasting purposes, and C. B. S. has bought similar rights to the name of the New York Philharmonic-Symphony; and if the companies have done this out of the devotion to music which they loudly proclaim, that devotion evidently is not sufficient to induce them, even on the most extraordinary of musical occasions, either to waive their commercially

valuable rights or to pool them and broadcast the performance jointly. Similarly the means exist by which the performance could be preserved for millions of persons to hear in years to come; but even without the Petrillo ban it would not be recorded because Victor has bought the rights to Toscanini's name and Columbia the rights to the New York Philharmonic-Symphony's.

As we have seen, even when C. B. S. or N. B. C. broadcasts a musical program local stations may not carry it: the reader who wrote me last year that C. B. S.'s Pittsburgh station did not broadcast the Sunday afternoon New York Philharmonic concerts wrote me recently that this station was cutting off the Budapest Quartet's Sunday morning programs at 11:30; and another wrote me that the Boston station was not carrying the Budapest Quartet broadcasts at all. But this reader informed me later that when she got all the people she knew to protest and demand, the station began to carry the program; and having succeeded here she was about to organize a campaign against the program commentators who annoyed her. If you and your friends are not getting the music you want, make a loud and prolonged noise about it: that is the only argument which broadcasting companies understand.

Mozart's eighteen sonatas for violin and piano are being played three or four at a time, with a work of Bach or Beethoven in between, by Szigeti and Foldes at the Y. M. H. A. Three or four of these sonatas would be too many for one time even with Mozart and Szigeti constantly at their best, and neither Mozart nor Szigeti is at his best at every moment; but their best moments are not to be missed. It takes Szigeti time to work himself up to the point of communicative intensity at which, functioning with complete assurance and mastery of his instrument, he produces those breath-takingly inflected lines of sustained melody, among other things; and until then one accepts the technical and musical manifestations of lack of equilibrium. One accepted them in the delightful early Sonata K. 296 which opened the first concert, for the wonderful playing that Szigeti began to do in the dull Sonata K. 481, for his magnificent performance of Bach's Chaconne, and for his playing in the Sonata K. 526 where Mozart too is at his best. The piano parts were sensitively phrased by Foldes; but a combination of raised piano-lid and

una corda pedal made their sound dull and thick.

In a performance of the Beethoven Concerto with the National Orchestra Association under Barzin a few days later Szigeti began again with playing that made the listener as uneasy as made the orchestra and conductor, until somewhere around the middle of the first movement it began to pull itself together and to build up to something magnificent; and at that he was not able to establish complete rapport with the orchestra. The performance of Bloch's Jewish Poems provided another demonstration of the combination of technical competence and musicianship which is so rare in conductors (as in pianists and violinists) that one would expect Barzin to have been grabbed by a major orchestra long ago. I heard only recently that he was considered a few years ago for the conductorship of the Minneapolis Symphony that in the end was given to Mitropoulos; and this made me as angry as it must have made Barzin. I don't say that any American should be engaged in preference to any foreigner; but I do say that a Barzin should be engaged in preference to a Mitropoulos.

B. H. HAGGIN

Art Note

MORRIS GRAVES. Gouaches. At the Willard Gallery, until November 28.

Graves works almost exclusively in gouache on paper. He takes most of his motifs from zoology and embroiders them decoratively—birds, snakes, rodents, and the like. All except his very latest pictures are unsatisfactory in one respect or another; yet they have elements of strength in them and make no gestures to fashion or publicity. In spite of the debt Graves owes to Klee in several instances—in addition to his titles, which have the same whimsy-fantasy—he is one of the most inventive painters in this country. His color is somehow not American, being all grays, gray-blues, restrained pinks and madders. Since the artist comes from Seattle, one might argue a Pacific or Oriental derivation. He seems to have, on the basis of his 1941 work, an important future ahead of him. He generates power out of lightness and fragility—that is, in his best work.

C. G.

Coming Soon in *The Nation*
"A Treasury of British Humor"
Reviewed by Irwin Edman

Letters to the Editors

Biddle's Order: a Third View

Dear Sirs: Can another voice be heard after Sforza's and Salvemini's on Biddle's Order (*The Nation*, November 7)? It is not a voice of full consent.

Of course it is splendid that Sforza and Toscanini and others of high rank in political and intellectual service are no longer "enemy aliens." Thankfulness must welcome an exoneration enabling, on less conspicuous levels, many harmless or useful Italians to live free and to find employment. But it is not so splendid that a number of German exiles, who suffered hardship and indignity at the hands of Nazism, who fled to this country as tested allies in a common cause, still are labeled "enemy aliens," with curfew and restrictions and, above all, the iniquity of being "technically" thrown back to the enemy camp against which they fought and still fight.

Words of hope we read in Biddle's speech, when he said: "I wish to emphasize that in thus removing the label of enemy alien from Italians, we do not forget that there are other loyal persons now classed as enemy aliens. Their situation is now being carefully and sympathetically studied by the Department of Justice." It seems that the study, perhaps excessively careful, has not been completed yet.

Biddle, whatever fine things he may have said otherwise in his speech, has insisted on national demarcations. One criterion is applied to the Italians, one to the Germans, still another to the Japanese. All of us—Americans born and Americans foreign born—should insist on demanding that the acquittal of the Italians be understood as a preface to the total and prompt repeal of the Enemy Alien Act, with discrimination among aliens to be made henceforth according to heart and mind, not to blood and soil. Then and then alone can Biddle's speech and order be greeted with unqualified applause.

Otherwise doubts may arise in suspecting minds. First it was the Austro-Hungarians who were exempted from the treatment of enemy aliens. Was it meant to please Otto von Hapsburg? Then it was the Italians. Was it meant to prop the diplomatic plot dramatized in Myron Taylor's visit to the Vatican? Italy is asked to break the chain that

binds it to Nazi Germany, later on to receive from the hands of "democracy" the clerico-royalist chain that is being forged not so secretly in some smithies on both sides of the Atlantic.

This cannot be Biddle's order. His speech, ringing with human feelings and with genuine love for the "other Italy," must stand above such suspicions. An act of undelayed justice for all aliens in America, no matter what the land they came from, will dispel the doubt that the excellent intentions of the Attorney General are being used in adjoining quarters for deplorable machinations.

G. A. BORGESE

Chicago, November 10

Yugoslavs Are Cheered

Dear Sirs: Attorney General Biddle's statement of October 12 that alien Italians in the United States are henceforth to be regarded as non-enemy aliens has met with immediate response in the Italian immigrant press in this country. Italians here welcome any move that has for its purpose the delivery of the Italian people from Fascist rule.

I believe that to have the picture complete your readers should also be informed that Attorney General Biddle made an additional statement on October 28 pertaining to the situation of those Yugoslavs who after the First World War had to live under Italy. According to a newspaper dispatch dated October 29, Biddle stated that "his present order removing Italian aliens from the alien-enemy classification applied also to aliens of Yugoslav nationality who were technically subjects of Italy by virtue of certain treaties negotiated following the First World War. The order also applies to Serb, Croat, and Slovene aliens who emigrated to this country from the former provinces of Zara, Udine, Gorizia, Trieste, Carnaro, Istria, Fiume, and Lastovo."

This news will undoubtedly cheer the souls of the 600,000 Yugoslavs who live in Italy. They have always been in the front line of the fight against Mussolini, and for that they have had to pay dearly. Execution, imprisonment, abolition of their native tongue, burning of schools and libraries have been their lot during the two decades of Italian rule. Yugoslav guerrillas, recruited partly from the peasant population of the region, have

successfully engaged Italian troops in the hinterland of Fiume, Trieste, and near Monte Nanos. Efforts are directed against railway lines and military objectives. It can be said without hesitation that the Yugoslavs of oppressed "Venezia Giulia" are an important link in the chain of the activities of the United Nations on the European continent. With the second front approaching the mainland, an organized and trained resistance in the Italian provinces has immediate military value; the most important railway connections between the Mediterranean and Central Europe lead through country which is under constant threat from the Yugoslav guerrilla army.

In the United States immigrants from Istria, Gorizia, and Trieste belong to the best section of the foreign-born population. By tradition they are deeply democratic and loyal. Today they are in the defense industry of Cleveland and Detroit, in the Coast Guard of the Pacific Coast, in the Allied merchant fleet. Slovenes from Trieste and Gorizia form part of the Allied army in Egypt and Libya.

Attorney General Biddle's statement of October 28 does justice to and encourages a brave people who are already playing their proper role in the Allied war effort.

NICHOLAS MIRKOVICH

New York, November 13

More Facts About the C. I. C.

Dear Sirs: In her letter to *The Nation* in your October 31 issue Geraldine Fitch treats well of the history, hopes, and aspirations of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. There are, however, some inaccuracies that should be corrected. In speaking of the International Committee she makes several points: (1) It has, she says, in remitting funds to the International Committee, by-passed the Central Headquarters. That depends on what by-passed means. Reports of donations to the regions are sent to the Central Headquarters so that the Central Headquarters can have an overall picture. (2) The International Committee is British and American with one Chinese as secretary. This also is not accurate. It was organized with ten Chinese and six British and Americans. That there are now more Americans is because the American money-raising organiza-

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tions demanded that there be Americans to report on American funds. Incidentally, the International Committee was one of the first organizations distributing foreign funds in China to be a mixed committee.

The reason for the present set of problems is that the central administration, now in the hands of five men appointed within the last few months, one of whom is George Fitch, wishes to control rather than guide and strengthen the local cooperatives. It has, for instance, "issued an order prohibiting regional headquarters, depots, and individual cooperatives from entering into contracts on their own." This tendency has been resisted by Rewi Alley and the Chinese with him; hence the desire to be rid of Rewi Alley and some of the Chinese leaders.

The International Committee, organized by people who for almost four years have been working for the original conception of the C. I. C., sends the funds to the cooperatives, for projects proposed by the secretaries and supervisors of the seven regions. The emphasis has been on helping the federations to get stronger. The officers of these federations are elected by the members and will in time take over all the functions of the servicing groups. It is not a question of whether the American money going to China shall be spent by a few foreigners or by the Chinese. It is a question of whether the American funds shall be controlled by a few Chinese in high places or by the thousands in the cooperatives.

There is no reason to "lose faith" in the cooperatives or in China. We know that nothing is ever accomplished in our own country without opposition by some groups. We hope the American people will continue their support of the Chinese people, who for five years have carried on this great struggle.

IDA PRUITT

New York, November 12

Sins of the Anthologists

Dear Sirs: I was requested some time ago by Mr. Whit Burnett to select some piece of writing of mine for his anthology called "This Is My Best." I suggested an essay called The Old Stone House, writing him that it "seemed to me one of my short pieces that came out best." In the book, which has now appeared, Mr. Burnett has quoted the sentence from my letter, substituting *means* for *seems* and thereby making nonsense of it; but—what is more seri-

ous—he has also left out the whole last third of my essay, which, in the form in which he presents it, is certainly far from one of the most successful of my pieces, and amounts, in fact, to a fraud on the readers of Mr. Burnett's anthology.

There is no way for the unfortunate Emerson to restrain Mr. Richard Aldington in his "Viking Book of Verse" from lopping off the last two stanzas of the Concord Hymn; but such incidents as this ought to warn living writers to safeguard themselves by written agreements against the impudent mutilations of the anthologists.

EDMUND WILSON

Wellfleet, Mass., November 9

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